

**INVESTIGATION REPORT
ASSASSINATION OF
MOHTARMA BENAZIR BHUTTO (SHAHEED)**



**BY
JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM**

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**REPORT OF JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM OF
CASE FIR NO.471/07 DATED 27.12.2007 U/Ss
302/324/435/436/120-B, 109-PPC, 4/5 ESA &
6/7 & 11-L ATA, PS CITY RAWALPINDI.**

BRIEF FACTS

On 27.12.2007 after addressing a public gathering in Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto left the venue in her vehicle No. BF/7772 white Toyota Land Cruiser along with PPP leaders etc. When her vehicle reached Liaquat road, for turning towards Murree Road, supporters of PPP assembled around her vehicle and started chanting slogans in favour of PPP & BB. Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto came out of the escape hatch of her vehicle and started waving hands to her supporters. Meanwhile, at about 5:11pm, an unknown person fired shots of pistol at her and then blew himself up. As a result Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto got injured and was brought to RGH, Rawalpindi, where she was pronounced dead. In this incident, 24 persons died and several injured. Accordingly a case was registered at Police Station City, Rawalpindi.

2. Soon after the occurrence the local police started investigation, collected all relevant articles/evidence from the scene of crime and examined a number of witnesses including police officers.

3. The face mask of the suspect was reconstructed and given wide publicity in the media to receive any useful clue/information leading to the culprits. The Government of the Punjab also announced Prize money of Rs.10 million in this regard. The articles recovered from the scene of crime were dispatched to the Experts for examination and report.

4. Meanwhile, Joint Investigation Team took over the investigation of the case and inspected the scene of crime. The detail of JIT is enclosed as **Annex: 'A'**.

5. The JIT held a meeting with the Intelligence Agencies and discussed various aspects of the case.

6. Besides, two telephone numbers (051-5488455, 051-5486586) were installed and given wide publicity in the media for the collection of any useful information from the public.

7. The Investigation Team of Scotland Yard (UK) also joined the Joint Investigation Team. The detail of Scotland Yard Team is enclosed as **Annex: 'B'**. The following areas of collaboration were identified:-

- a. Reconstruction of the crime scene by Scotland Yard team with the help of local police.
- b. Determination of the actual number of assailant(s).
- c. Evaluation of present evidence.
- d. Detailed examination of the affected vehicles.
- e. Determination of Mohtarma's cause of death in the light of medical and forensic evidence.

f. Any other area needing further investigation and forensic exploration.

8. The UK team visited the scene of crime, inspected the blast affected vehicles minutely and took a number of samples for forensic analysis. The team also examined X-Rays of BB's head and held meeting with all concerned doctors who provided medical treatment to Mohtarma (Shaheed) in RGH, Rawalpindi.

9. The Scotland Yard team also visited the CMH & DHQ Hospital, Rawalpindi, examined the human limbs, (taken/collected from the scene of occurrence and deposited in the cold storage of the Hospitals) and obtained tissues for the DNA test. The team also examined and discussed the articles recovered by the Local Police from the scene of crime.

10. Twenty three (23) articles were recovered from the crime scene:-

- i. One pistol 9 mm with one magazine & five live cartridges of 9 mm bore.
- ii. One pistol .30 calibre with two magazines.
- iii. Two empty cartridges of .30 calibre.
- iv. Two ball bearings.
- v. One electronic circuit.
- vi. One human right hand severed below the wrist & missing the index finger.

- vii. One human right hand severed above the wrist with complete fingers.
- viii. One human left hand and one thumb.
- ix. One human face mask of the suspect.
- x. One fragment of human skull.
- xi. Legs of suspect with shoes (Sandals).
- xii. Two Legs of Victim (Later identified).
- xiii. One Jacket.
- xiv. One wrist watch.
- xv. One mobile phone.
- xvi. One bunch of keys.
- xvii. Two Blast Affected Vehicles of Police.
- xviii. One Blast Affected Land Cruiser of BB (Shaheed).
- xix. A Green piece of cloth with Quranic verses.
- xx. Mohtarma's pair of shoes.
- xxi. Numerous ID Cards & Visiting Cards.
- xxii. Debris consisting of human flesh & remains of human bodies, collected and stored/deposited in cold storages of Hospitals.
- xxiii. Samples of Blood & Explosives.

11. Fifteen (15) articles were taken by Scotland Yard Team for examination at UK. These were returned to JIT after examination:-

1. X-rays of BB (original).
2. X-rays of legs of suspect.
3. Copies of postmortem reports of all victims.

4. Ballistics reports.
 5. DNA reports.
 6. Report that details the identification of bodies/any body part including 3 hands.
 7. Expert Reports.
 8. List of dead and the means of their identification.
 9. .30 bore pistol, 9mm bore pistol, .30 bore shell case, .38 bore shell case, .30 bore undamaged and damaged magazines, 9 mm magazine and live bullets.
 10. Fragment of skull.
 11. Jacket.
 12. Mobile phone.
 13. List of articles recovered.
 14. Copy of fingerprints taken.
 15. Photographs of identity cards & visiting cards recovered from the crime scene.
12. **Experts Reports:-**
- a. Report of the Chemical Examiner Lahore stating therein that the blood secured by cotton swabs from the scene of crime was blood stained.
 - b. A report of Serologist, showing that the articles recovered from the scene of crime were human blood stained.
 - c. DNA test report of Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Rawalpindi stating therein that the limbs examined were of the same individual with a male genotype.

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- d. Post Mortem report (External) of the persons died of the blast.
- e. Medico-legal reports of the injured persons prepared by the medical officers.
- f. Report of the Bacteriologist, Govt. of the Punjab, Health Department, indicating that the material examined could be the white matter of the brain (recovered from the Mohtarma's vehicle). As per report of the Centre for Applied Molecular Biology (CAMB), Forensic Services Laboratory Lahore the brain matter was of a female source.

13. **Medical Report of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto(Shaheed)**

There was a wound in right Temporoparietal region. Shape was irregularly oval, measuring about 5 x 3 cms, just above the pinna of right ear. Edges were irregular. No surrounding wounds or blackening was seen. There was a big boggy swelling around the wound. Blood was continuously trickling down and whitish material that looked like brain matter was seen in the wound and on the surrounding hair. Sharp bone edges were felt in wound. No foreign body was felt in the wound.

X-Ray Report

Comminuted depressed skull fracture involving right temporoparietal bone is observed with inwards depressed fracture fragment measuring approx. 35 mm (on X-ray measurement). Depressed fracture fragment distant from intact bony skull measures 12 mm from outer to outer skull table & 12 mm from inner to inner skull table. Two to three tiny radio-densities underneath fracture segment are observed on both projections. Associated scalp soft tissue swelling moderate degree of pneumocephalus is observed. Rest of the bony skull is intact. Radio-opaque dental fillings are evident.

Cause of Death

"Open head injury with depressed skull fracture, leading to Cardiopulmonary arrest".

(Annex: 'C')

14. **Executive Summary of Scotland Yard Team**

"On the 27th December 2007, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), died as the result of being attacked in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

Following discussions between the Prime Minister and President Musharraf, it was agreed that officers from the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command (SO 15) should support the investigation into Ms Bhutto's death. The primary focus of the Scotland Yard team was to assist the Pakistani authorities in establishing the cause and circumstances of Ms Bhutto's death. The wider investigation to establish culpability has remained entirely a matter for the Pakistani authorities.

The SO 15 team was led by a Detective Superintendent Senior Investigating Officer and comprised two forensic experts, an expert in analyzing and assessing video media and an experienced investigating officer. The team arrived in Pakistan on 4th January 2008 and spent two and a half weeks conducting extensive enquiries. During the course of their work, the team was joined by other specialists from the United Kingdom.

The UK team were given extensive support and co-operation by the Pakistani authorities, Ms Bhutto's family, and senior officials from Ms Bhutto's Party.

The Terms of Reference to which the UK team worked were centered upon establishing the precise sequence of events from the conclusion of Ms Bhutto's speech at the political rally in Rawalpindi on the 27th December, until the time at which she was pronounced dead at Rawalpindi General Hospital later that day.

The task of establishing exactly what happened was complicated by the lack of an extended and detailed search of the crime scene, the absence of an autopsy, and the absence of recognized body recovery and victim identification processes. Nevertheless, the evidence that is available is sufficient for reliable conclusions to be drawn.

Within the overall objective, a particular focus has been placed on establishing the actual cause of death, and whether there were one or more attackers in the immediate vicinity of Ms Bhutto.

The cause of death

Considerable reliance has been placed upon the X-rays taken at Rawalpindi General Hospital following Ms. Bhutto's death. Given their importance, the x-rays have been independently verified as being of Ms Bhutto by comparison with her dental x-rays. Additionally, a

valuable insight was gained from the accounts given by the medical staff involved in her treatment, and from those members of Ms Bhutto's family who washed her body before burial.

Ms Bhutto's only apparent injury was a major trauma to the right side of the head. The UK experts all exclude this injury being an entry or exit wound as a result of gunshot. The only X-ray records, taken after her death, were of Ms Bhutto's head. However, the possibility of a bullet wound to her mid or lower trunk can reasonably be excluded. This is based upon the protection afforded by the armoured vehicle in which she was traveling at the time of the attack, and the accounts of her family and hospital staff who examined her.

The limited X-ray material, the absence of a full post mortem examination and CT scan, have meant that the UK Home Office pathologist, Dr Nathaniel Cary, who has been consulted in this case, is unable categorically to exclude the possibility of there being a gunshot wound to the upper trunk or neck. However when his findings are put alongside the accounts of those who had close contact with Ms Bhutto's body, the available evidence suggests possibility that there was no gunshot injury. Importantly, Dr Cary excludes the possibility of a bullet to the neck or upper trunk as being a relevant factor in

the actual cause of death, when set against the nature and extent of her head injury.

In his report Dr. Cary states:

- *"the only tenable cause for the rapidly fatal head injury in this case is that it occurred as the result of impact due to the effects of the bomb-blast."*
- *"in my opinion Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto died as a result of a severe head injury sustained as a consequence of the bomb-blast and due to head impact somewhere in the escape hatch of the vehicle."*

Given the severity of the injury to Ms Bhutto's head, the prospect that she inadvertently hit her head whilst ducking down into the vehicle can be excluded as reasonable possibility.

High explosives of the type typically, used in this sort of device, detonate at a velocity between 6000 and 9000 meters per second. This means that when considering the explosive quantities and distances involved, such an explosion would generate significantly more force than would be necessary to provoke the consequences as occurred in this case.

It is also important to comment upon the construction of the vehicle. It was fitted with B6 grade armour and designed to withstand gunfire and bomb-blast. It is an unfortunate and misleading aspect of this case that the roof escape hatch has frequently been referred to as a sunroof. It is not. It is designed and intended to be used solely as a means of escape. It has a solid lip with a depth of 9cm.

- Ms Bhutto's injury is entirely consistent with her head impacting upon the lip of the escape hatch. Detailed analysis of the media footage provides supporting evidence. Ms Bhutto's head did not completely disappear from view until 0.6 seconds before the blast. She can be seen moving forward and to the right as she ducked down into the vehicle. Whilst her exact head position at the time of the detonation can never be ascertained, the overwhelming conclusion must be that she did not succeed in getting her head entirely below the lip of the escape hatch when the explosion occurred.

How many people were involved in the immediate attack?

- There has been speculation that two individuals were directly involved in the attack. The suggestion has been that one suspect fired shots, and a second detonated the bomb. All the available evidence points toward the person who fired shots and the person who detonated the explosives being one and the same person.
- Body parts from only one individual remain unidentified. Experts opinion provides strong evidence that they originate from the suicide bomber.
- Analysis of the media footage places the gunman at the rear of the vehicle and looking down immediately before the explosion. The footage does not show the presence of any other potential bomber.
- This footage when considered alongside the findings of the forensic explosive expert, that the bombing suspect was within 1 to 2 meters of the vehicle towards its rear and with no person or other obstruction between him and the vehicle, strongly suggests that the bomber and gunman were at the same position. It is virtually inconceivable that anyone who was where the gunman can clearly be seen on the media footage, could have survived the blast and escaped.

- The inevitable conclusion is that there was one attacker in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle in which Ms Bhutto was traveling.
- In essence, all the evidence indicates that one suspect has fired the shots before detonating an improvised explosive device. At the time of the attack this person was standing close to the rear of Ms Bhutto's vehicle. The blast caused a violent collision between her head and the escape hatch area of the vehicle, causing a severe and fatal head injury".

(Annex: 'D')

15. Detailed report of Scotland Yard Team is enclosed at **Annex: 'E'**.

16. As the postmortem of the dead body of the Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto (Shaheed) was pre-requisite for the determination of cause of her death, the Home department, Govt. of Sindh, was moved through the Home department, Govt. of the Punjab, to request the legal heirs of the Mohtarma to allow the exhumation for conducting postmortem. However, the request has not been acceded to so far.

17. The Doctors who prepared medical report were examined and interviewed.

18. One hundred and ninty five (195) witnesses including Major (Retd) Imtiaz Hussain, Chief Security Officer of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto (Shaheed) who was then travelling in the vehicle of Mohtarma at the time of occurrence were also examined.

19. Maj (R) Imtiaz Hussain, Chief Security Officer to Mohtarma BB (Shaheed) and Mr. Farooq A. Naik, Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan were requested to contact Makhdoom Amin Fahim, Ms Sherry Rehman and other PPP leaders/workers who were travelling in the vehicle of 'Mohtarma' at the time of occurrence to join the investigation for recording their statements. The processes were also issued to them with the request to join the Investigation. However, none of them joined the Investigation to record their statements.

20. In addition, Mr. Asif Ali Zardari, Co-chairperson of PPP was also addressed a D.O Letter with the request to ask all concerned to join the investigation and record their statements u/s 161 Cr.PC.

21. **Accused Arrested**

- i. Aitezaz Shah @ Saif Ullah s/o Syed Zaheer Ahmad Shah caste Syed r/o Mauza Sangal Kot Mansehra, presently, Metrowheel Karachi.
- ii. Sher Zaman s/o Akbar Khan r/o Segha Janubi Waziristan.
- iii. Husnain Gul @ Ali s/o Muhammad Riaz r/o Shah Jeewan Colony, Rawalpindi.
- iv. Muhammad Razaqat s/o Sabir Hussain caste Awan r/o Ahmad Abad, Quaid-e-Azam Colony, Rawalpindi.
- v. Rasheed Ahmad @ Abdul Raheem Turabi s/o Qudrat Shah r/o Sareekh Morozai Shabqadar, Charshadha.

a) **Disclosure by accused Aitezaz Shah**

- i. Was inspired by the "JEHADI KARNAMEY"
- ii. Reached Taliban Markaz Makeen (Waziristan) in May 2007 without parent's permission.
- iii. Was trained by Sana Ullah, Ameer Taliban Centre.
- iv. Was inspired through speeches of Maulvi Ishaq, Imam Masjid, Taliban Markaz Makeen.
- v. Was taken to Taliban Markaz Ladha and then to Taliban Markaz Tungai where Roza Din carried out his brain washing and prepared him for suicide attack. He also trained him in driving.
- vi. Was told to commit suicide attack on Benazir Bhutto by Roza Din in October 2007 to which he agreed.
- vii. Visited the house of Sher Zaman, Co-accused in Seega where Amjad r/o Swabi and Sabir r/o Kot Kai were present as suicide attackers on Benazir. The plan could not be implemented as some of their companions had been arrested in Peshawar.
- viii. After third day of Eid-ul-Azha, visited the house of Sher Zaman and on asking as to why he was not being sent for suicide attack, Sher Zaman informed him that Bait Ullah Mehsud had given Rs. 50,000/- to some one to bring suicide jacket, explosive etc. and that the plan got late due to non arrival of the said person. Added that now he had provided the articles and he would be dispatched for suicide attack on Benazir Bhutto.
- ix. On 27.12.2007, at night time he came to know through BBC that a suicide attack had been committed on Benazir Bhutto. And that it was carried out by Saeed @ Bilal and Ikram of Barwand Markaz. Also came to know that Ikram had come

back alive. Wali Muhammad also told him that in case of her survival in the attack by Saeed @ Bilal etc. he would have been sent for the purpose.

- x. He met Bait Ullah Mehsud four times.
- xi. On 16.01.2008, Wali Muhammad, Ameer Dhelay Markaz told him that his time / turn for suicide attack had come. He made preparations.
- xii. Was told to contact Sher Zaman on phone on reaching D.I Khan.
- xiii. Was arrested by D.I Khan Police followed by the arrest of Sher Zaman Khan who led to the recovery of explosives.
- xiv. During interrogation, identified the voice of Bait Ullah Mehsud while listening recorded conversation provided by the Ministry of Interior.
- xv. Confessed his crime in statement u/s 164 CrPC.

b) Disclosure by accused Sher Zaman

- i. Supported the disclosures made by Aitezaz Shah.
- ii. Was informed by Ameer Nawaz Mehsud etc. that they were planning for killing Benazir.
- iii. Also heard them talking to Bait Ullah Mehsud on phone.
- iv. Was told by them that they had made preparation for killing Benazir in every city of the country.
- v. Was paid Rs. 7000/- and asked to locate proper place in Larkana for attacking Benazir.
- vi. Visited Karachi in January 2008 on the call of Faiz Muhammad for the commission of dacoity etc for the collection of funds for Bait Ullah Mehsud.

(On checking, it was found that a dacoity took place in the area of Police Station Preedi, Karachi in which an amount of Rs. 15 crores were looted and case FIR No. 8/2008 u/s 395/PPC was registered at PS Preedi)

- vii. Was taking Aitezaz Shah to Faiz Muhammad in Karachi for suicide attack on the direction of Zain-ud-Din, r/o Ladha.

c) Accused Husnain Gul

- i. Was arrested from near Special Communication Organization Office, Misarial Road dated 07.02.2008 at 8.20 AM.
- ii. Articles Recovered: (1) One Hand Grenade (2) One Mobile Phone Motorola (3) One mobile phone Nokia-1112.
(Case FIR No. 76 dated 07.02.2008 u/s 3/4 ESA & 13/20/65 AO, PS Westridge, Rawalpindi)
- iii. Also got recovered a pair of Joggers, Shawl and head gear (belonging to suicide attacker Saeed @ Bilal) and CPU from his house.

d) Disclosure by accused Husnain Gul

- i. Got admission in religious Madrissa from village Wesa Hazro.
- ii. Got training in arms in 2005 from Taliban Markaz of Qari Abbas in Miran Shah.

- iii. During training, he came into contact with Nadir Khan @ Qari Ismail, Ameer Madrissa Haqania, Akora Khatak Group who had close links with Bait Ullah Mehsud.
- iv. Was expelled from Madrissa on the charge of Jehadi activities and then got admission in Madrissa Muhammadiyah, China Chowk, Islamabad. His friend was killed in Lal Masjid operation and as such he decided to take revenge.
- v. Went to Nadir @ Qari Ismail in Akora Khatak and met with NasrUllah @ Ahmad, Ibad-ur-Rehman @ Nauman @ Usman and AbdUllah @ Saddam who were also annoyed with the Government/Ministers over Lal Masjid operation and Military operation in Waziristan. Decided to launch suicide attacks.
- vi. Was selected to identify targets in Rawalpindi.
- vii. The suicide jacket and suicide attackers were provided by Nadir @ Qari Ismail through his accomplices including Faiz Muhammad @ Kiskat etc.
- viii. Also instigated his cousin Rifaqat who became his accomplice.
- ix. Got committed suicide attacks on the vehicle of a Col. at R.A Bazar Chowk on 04.09.2007 and Police picket Golf Road Rawalpindi on 30.10.2007.
- x. Planned several suicide attempts on the life of Sheikh Rasheed but could not accomplish.
- xi. Visited Akora Khatak in November 2007, where Qari Ismail told him that they had been directed to kill Benazir as she had been sent to eliminate Taliban and Mujahideen by the USA.
- xii. Nadir @ Qari Ismail, NasrUllah @ Ahmad etc and Husnain Gul planned to kill Benazir through suicide attack in election Jalsas.

- xiii. Organized rehearsal for suicide attack on Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto in Pubbi Naushera Area on 12.12.2007.
- xiv. Suicide attack could not be carried out in Peshawar on 26.12.2007 due to tight security.
- xv. 5/6 days prior to Eid-ul-Azha 2007, Nasrullah @ Ahmad reached Rawalpindi and was brought to home by him and his cousin Rafaqat on their Taxi # BK-1427.
- xvi. Carried out recce of Liaqat Bagh and then went to Islamabad to see Parliament House and Lal Masjid.
- xvii. Nasrullah @ Ahmad went back. Husnain remained in contact with Qari Ismail and Nasrullah on phone.
- xviii. Received Telephone call stating that Nasrullah @ Ahmad, Saeed @ Bilal and Ikram Ullah were reaching for suicide attack. After about 2/3 hours Nasrullah @ Ahmad informed him about his arrival in Rawalpindi. Reached Daewoo Bus stand Peshawar Road Rawalpindi alongwith Rafaqat in Taxi # BK-1427 and brought Nasrullah @ Ahmad, Saeed @ Bilal and Ikram Ullah to Rafaqat's house.
- xix. Decided to launch suicide attack on Benazir Bhutto at the end of public meeting in Liaqat Bagh.
- xx. Nasrullah @ Ahmad and Rafaqat conducted recce on 27.12.2007 at 8/9 am. Took both suicide attackers to home.
- xxi. Got prepared Saeed @ Bilal and Ikram Ullah for suicide attack by giving them suicide jackets, a Pistol .30 bore and live bullets besides hand grenade. Saeed @ Bilal also put on black sun glasses of Husnain.
- xxii. Saeed @ Bilal was stationed on the exit gate of Benazir Bhutto whereas Ikram Ullah was stationed near a public gate with directions that in case of

Saeed's @ Bilal failure, he would launch the suicide attack.

- xxiii. Decided to launch suicide attack inside the Jalsa but the suicide attacker could not reach inside the ground due to rush.
- xxiv. Meanwhile, heard firing followed by an explosion.
- xxv. Nasrullah left for Daewoo Ada whereas Ikram Ullah could not be located.
- xxvi. Left for home with Rafaqat and on the way heard about the death of Benazir Bhutto.

e) Disclosure by accused Muhammad Rafaqat

- i. Was arrested from near SCO Office, Misarial Road dated 07.02.2008.
- ii. Articles Recovered: (1) Detonator (2) 24 Cartridges lived 30 Bore (3) One Cartridge missed 30 Bore (4) Taxi No.BK-1427 FX Model 1986 black & Yellow colour (5) Registration Book of Taxi BK-1427 (6) Rout Permit Taxi BK-1427.
- iii. Both Husnain and Rafaqat confessed their crime in their statements u/s 164 CrPc.

f) Disclosure by accused Rasheed Ahmed @ Abdul Rahim Turabi

- i. Was arrested on 14.02.2008 by JIT.
- ii. Disclosed that, he remained student of Madrissa Haqania Akora Khatak for 2 years where he came into contact with Nadir @ Qari Ismail and his accomplices namely Nasrullah @ Ahmad, Abdullah @ Sadam and Abad-ur-Rehman @ Nauman @ Usman. They all had close contacts with Bait Ullah Mehsud.
- iii. Was admitted in Madrissa Munba-ul-Aloom, Miran Shah and received Jehadi training.

- iv. On 20.12.2007, Nadir @ Qari Ismail, Nasrullah @ Ahmad r/o Waziristan and Abdullah @ Sadam met him in Room # 11 of the Madrissa. They told him that they were going to see Bait Ullah Mehsud as he had summoned them for an important task.
- v. They came back after two days alongwith another young boy of 20 years and introduced him as Saeed @ Bilal.
- vi. Was told that they had gone to see Bait Ullah Mehsud in Makeen Markaz who had handed over Saeed @ Bilal to them for launching suicide attack on Benazir Bhutto and that Bait Ullah Mehsud had paid an amount of Rs. 4 lacs to Qari Ismail to accomplish this plan.
- vii. After about 15 days, when he visited Akora Khatak, he met Qari Ismail, Nasrullah @ Ahmad and Abdullah @ Sadam in Room # 83 of the Madrissa where he was told by Abdullah @ Sadam that Nadir @ Qari Ismail, Nasrullah @ Ahmad and Husnain Gul had got committed suicide attack on Benazir Bhutto through suicide attacker Saeed @ Bilal.
- viii. Also disclosed that he alongwith others fixed missiles (rockets) in the fields for firing on Kamra Complex.
- ix. He confessed his crime in his statement u/s 164 Cr.PC.

22. Telephonic Linkage/contacts of accused, involved in the case.

During the course of investigation, a CD containing telephonic conversation between Ameer Sahib (Bait Ullah Mehsud) through telephone number 0928-230493 with one Maulvi Sahib at telephone number 0965-238387, was taken

into possession. Telephone Number 0928-230493 is in the name of Mazhar-ud-Din s/o Rehmat Ullah r/o Dara POL, Makeen-Razmak. Telephone Number 0965-238387 is in the name of Haji Shah Wali Khan s/o Muhammad Shah r/o Kinni Guram- South Waziristan. The call was made on 28.12.2007 at 09:14 AM.

23. The voice of Bait Ullah Mehsud was identified by accused Aitezaz Shah in his statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C.

24. The Urdu text of the translation of telephonic conversation in Pushto is as under:-


مولوی صاحب	اسلام علیکم
امیر صاحب (بیت اللہ محسود)	وعلیکم اسلام
مولوی صاحب	امیر صاحب کیا حال ہے؟
امیر صاحب (بیت اللہ محسود)	ٹھیک ہے
مولوی صاحب	مبارک ہو میں تو ابھی رات کو پہنچا ہوں
امیر صاحب (بیت اللہ محسود)	تمہیں بھی مبارک ہو ہمارے بندے تھے۔
مولوی صاحب	ہاں ہمارے والے تھے۔
امیر صاحب (بیت اللہ محسود)	کون کون تھے؟

مولوی صاحب	سعید تھا دوسرا بدوہ الا بال تھا اور اکرام اللہ بھی تھا۔
امیر صاحب (بیت اللہ محسود)	تینوں نے کیا ہے؟
مولوی صاحب	اکرام اللہ اور بال نے کیا ہے
امیر صاحب (بیت اللہ محسود)	پھر تو خیر مبارک
مولوی صاحب	کیاں ہو میں آپ سے ماننا چاہتا ہوں
امیر صاحب (بیت اللہ محسود)	کلمین میں ہوں آ جاؤ میں انور شاہ کے گھر میں ہوں
مولوی صاحب	ٹھیک ہے میں آتا ہوں
امیر صاحب (بیت اللہ محسود)	اسے شوٹ بڑا خوب کیا ہے بڑے ولیر لڑکے تھے۔

مولوی صاحب	ماشاء اللہ جب میں آ جاؤں تو تمہیں تفصیل سے آگاہ کروں گا۔ تمہیں زیادہ مزہ آئے گا۔
امیر صاحب (بیت اللہ محسود)	میں آپ کا انتظار کروں گا مبارک ہو ایک دفعہ پھر مبارک ہو
مولوی صاحب	خیر مبارک
امیر صاحب (بیت اللہ محسود)	کوئی خدمت
مولوی صاحب	بڑی مہربانی
امیر صاحب (بیت اللہ محسود)	اسلام علیکم
مولوی صاحب	و علیکم السلام

25. In addition, in their statements u/s 164 Cr.PC, the accused also disclosed the telephone numbers through which they remained in contact with their terrorist network. Accordingly, the telephone data indicating their contacts before and on the day of occurrence was collected and placed on record.

26. The following table shows the details of their contacts:-



27. **Role of Bait Ullah Mehsud**

In the light of statements / confessions of Aitezaz Shah, Sher Zaman, Husnain Gul, Muhammad Razaqat and Rasheed Ahmad Turabi, it stands proved that Bait Ullah Mehsud not only conspired / made plan for killing Benazir Bhutto and provided suicide attackers but also paid an amount of Rs. 4 lacs to Nadir @ Qari Ismail for this purpose. Earlier he gave Rs. 50,000/- to a person for providing suicide jacket, explosives etc for launching suicide attack on Benazir Bhutto (Disclosed by Sher Zaman). All this finds support from the above said telephonic conversation wherein he congratulated one Maulvi Sahib (his accomplice) to have killed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto (*Shaheed*) through the suicide killer, launched by them for the purpose.

28. During the course of investigation, it came to surface that accused Nadir @ Qari Ismail and Nasrullah @ Ahmad had been killed by Mohmand Riffles at Khapar Check Post Mohmand Agency during an encounter.

29. The Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Govt. of Pakistan, Islamabad has been requested vide this office letter No.185/CID dated: 19.02.2008 to get it verified from the quarters concerned. On receipt of verification report, the local police will proceed further in the light thereof. **(Annex: 'F')**

30. The following accused persons involved in the subject case are absconding. The local police will make efforts for their arrest. In case of their non-arrest, their warrants of arrest be obtained, followed by issuance of proclamations under section 87 Cr.P.C. for getting them declared as POs:-

- i. Bait Ullah Mehsud r/o South Waziristan
- ii. Ibad-ur-Rehman @ Nauman @ Usman (Ex student, Madrissa Akora Khatak)
- iii. AbdUllah @ Saddam r/o Mohmand Agency
- iv. Faiz Muhammad @ Kiskat (Ex student, Madrissa Akora Khatak)
- v. Ikram Ullah r/o South Waziristan

The local police will also obtain the result of CPU from SIG/FIA to proceed further accordingly.

31. Mr. Muhammad Hussain Chachhar, Additional Prosecutor General, Lahore and Sardar Muhammad Ishaq Khan, Advocate Supreme Court, Rawalpindi, were appointed as Special Prosecutors for conducting prosecution of the case.

32. All the accused are found involved in this occurrence and recommended for trial in ATA Court Rawalpindi. An incomplete challan against Muhammad Rafaqat and Husnain Gul @ Ali, etc. u/s 302/324/435/436/120-B/109 PPC, 4/5 ESA, 7 ATA has been sent to court on 27.02.2008. In addition, Aitezaz Shah, Sher Zaman and Rashid Ahmed @ Abdul Rahim Turabi have been challaned u/s 11/L, 6/7 ATA on 27.02.08 in the subject case. **(Annex: G-I & II)**

33. The CPO/DIG Rawalpindi has been asked for follow up action.

34. The Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, has been requested to direct the concerned quarters to initiate appropriate action against those other members of Bait Ullah Mehsud network involved in terrorist activities including imparting training to suicide bombers etc.

(Annex: 'H')

ANNEXURE-'A'

JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM

(A) Punjab Police

1. Mr. Abdul Majeed, Addl. IGP, CID, Punjab, Lahore. Convener
2. Mr. Mushtaq Ahmad Sukhera, DIG/CID, Punjab, Lahore. Member
3. Mr. Waqar Ahmad Chohan, SP/Traffic Region, Rawalpindi. Member
4. Mr. Tahir Ayub, SP/Investigation, Rawalpindi. Member
5. Raja Basharat Mahmood, DSP/RO, CID, Rawalpindi. Member
6. Mr. Tariq Ilyas Kayani, Inspector, CID, Lahore. Member
7. Mr. Ashfaq Ahmad, Sub-Inspector, CID/Hqrs. Lahore. Member

(B) FIA

1. Mr. Muhammad Khalid Qureshi, DIG/Commandant, SIG/FIA. Member
2. Mir Zubair Mehmood, DIG/Director, FIA, Karachi. Member
3. Maj (Retd) Shafqatullah Malik, Explosive Expert, SIG/FIA. Member

(C) Sindh Police

1. Mr. Ghulam Haider Jamali, DIG/Commandant, PTC, Karachi. Nominated Member
2. Mr. Javed Akhter Odho, SSP/ADIG, CCPO, Karachi. Nominated Member

(D) Associate Members

1. Mr. Shah Hussain, SSP/Investigation Branch, Bahawalpur.
2. Mr. Aftab Ahmad, Incharge, Scientific Investigation Wing, Police College, Sihala.
3. Ch. Mujahid Hussain, DSP/Sadar, Rawalpindi.
4. Ch. Muhammad Sarwar Shahid, DSP/Security, Rawalpindi.

ANNEXURE-'B'

NEW SCOTLAND YARD'S COUNTER TERRORISM COMMAND(SO15)

- | | | |
|-----|---|--------------------------------|
| 1. | Detective Superintendent John MacBrayne | Team Leader |
| 2. | Detective Inspector Dean Lawrence | Footage Expert |
| 3. | Detective Sergeant Gareth Griffith | Investigation |
| 4. | Detective Sergeant Martin Phelan | Forensics |
| 5. | Detective Constable Richard Hall | Forensics |
| 6. | Mr. Cliff Todd | Forensic Explosives Scientist |
| 7. | Mrs.Sharon Broome | Forensic Explosives Scientist |
| 8. | Mrs. Hazel Hutson | Forensic Explosives Scientist |
| 9. | Mr. Tony Martin | Computer-aided modeling Bureau |
| 10. | Mr. Ian Eays | Computer-aided modeling Bureau |
| 11. | Mr. Javed Edathally | Computer-aided modeling Bureau |

Liaison Officers:

1. Detective Superintendent Keith Pearce.
2. Detective Superintendent Martin Morrissey.

ANNEXURE - 'C'

No 821/PS
Dated 28.12.2007.

To

The City Police Officer,
Rawalpindi.

Subject :-

MEDICAL EXAMINATION REPORT OF MOHTARMA
BENAIZER BHUTTO.

Enclosed please find herewith a sealed report regarding medical examination of Mohtarma Benaizer Bhutto conducted by the Doctors at Rawalpindi General Hospital, Rawalpindi on 27.12.2007. Further necessary action may kindly be taken accordingly.

m u d
28/12/07
District Coordination Officer,
Rawalpindi

Imu -
for action

Imu
28/12/07

MEDICAL REPORT OF MOHTARMA BENAZIR BHUTTO

On 27-12-2007 at approximately 5.35 p.m. a female patient was brought in Accident & Emergency Department of Rawalpindi General Hospital, Rawalpindi. She was brought to the Resuscitation Room and was received by Dr. Aurangzeb Khan and Dr. Saeeda of Surgical Unit-II. This patient was identified as Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.

Dr. Habib Ahmad Khan, Medical Superintendent RGH also arrived immediately.

The condition appreciated at the time of receiving the patient was as follows:-

The patient was pulseless and was not breathing. She was markedly pale. Her pupils were fixed, dilated and non reacting to light. A wound was present on the right temporoparietal region through which blood was trickling down and whitish material which looked like brain matter was visible in the wound. Her clothes were soaked with blood.

Immediate cardiopulmonary resuscitation was started. She was ventilated by Ambu bag and within a minute was intubated with endotracheal tube, blood mixed with secretions was noticed in the throat, that was suctioned out before intubation. External cardiac compressions were started. A cannula was passed in her right hand and intravenous fluids were pushed in. Inj. adrenaline was given.

No response was seen. Patient was shifted to emergency operation theatre while resuscitation was continued.

In operation theatre Dr Arshad, Anaesthetist joined the team. Prof Mussadiq Khan also joined the team at 5.50 PM. As external cardiac massage was not leading to any success therefore open cardiac massage was started via left antero-lateral thoracotomy. No blood was seen in the left thoracic cavity or the pericardium. There was no cardiac muscular activity seen.

Artificial assisted ventilation, internal cardiac massage and intravenous fluid resuscitation was continued. She was given intra cardiac adrenaline, calcium gluconate. These drugs along with sodium bicarbonate were also repeated intravenously.

Though no cardiac activity was seen but in order to treat fine ventricular fibrillation, electrical defibrillation was carried out. No cardiac response was seen.

Prof. Azam Yusuf and Dr. Qudsia had also joined the resuscitation team.

Pupils were fixed and dilated, no evidence of any cardiac or respiratory activity was observed. ECG showed no electrical activity.

At 6.16 p.m it was decided to stop resuscitation and patient was declared dead. The thoracotomy wound was closed. Fractured rib due to resuscitative thoracotomy was noticed.

Prof Arif Malik and Prof Saleem also reached by then.

Saeeda
28/12/2007

Arshad

Budge

Arif Malik

Qudsia

DETAILS OF THE WOUND AND ITS SURROUNDINGS

There was wound in right Temporoparietal region. Shape was irregularly oval, measuring about 5 x 3 cms, just above the pinna of right ear. Edges were irregular. No surrounding wounds or blackening was seen. There was a big boggy swelling around the wound. Blood was continuously trickling down and whitish material that looked like brain matter was seen in the wound and on the surrounding hair. Sharp bone edges were felt in wound. No foreign body was felt in the wound.

Wound was not further explored. Gentle aseptic dressing was used to cover the wound

Bleeding from both the ears was seen, more so from the right ear. Slight trickle of Blood was seen from right nostril also. Blood mixed with secretions was seen in the oral cavity also. Detailed external examination of the body did not reveal any other external injury.

X-rays of the skull AP and Lateral views were done after she had been declared dead. Findings are as below:-

Comminuted depressed skull fracture involving right temporoparietal bone is observed with inwards depressed fracture fragment measuring approx. 35 mm (on-X-ray measurement). Depressed fracture fragment distant from intact bony skull measures 12 mm from outer to outer skull table & 12 mm from inner to inner skull table. Two to three tiny radio-densities underneath fracture segment are observed on both projections. Associated scalp soft tissue swelling & moderate degree of pneumocephalus is observed. Rest of the bony skull is intact. Radio-opaque dental fillings are evident.

CAUSE OF DEATH

Open head injury with depressed skull fracture, leading to Cardiopulmonary arrest.

Survelo
28/12/2007

[Signature]
[Signature]
[Signature]

Prof. Mohammad Mussadiq Khan
FACS, DABS, FCPS
Principal/Professor of Surgery
RMC/Allied Hospital, Rawalpindi

Mussadiq

28/12/2007

Dr. Habib Ahmad Khan
Medical Superintendent
Rawalpindi General Hospital
Rawalpindi

H.A. Khan

Prof. Azam Yusuf, FRCS, FCPS
Professor of Surgery
Head of Surgical Unit-II
Rawalpindi General Hospital
Rawalpindi

A. Yusuf

Dr. Aurangzeb Khan FCPS
Registrar S.U II
Rawalpindi General Hospital
Rawalpindi

A. Khan

Dr. Saeeda Yasmin
Post graduate Resident
Surgical Unit-II
Rawalpindi General Hospital
Rawalpindi

S. Yasmin

Dr. Qudsiya Anjum Qureshi FCPS
Anaesthetist
Rawalpindi General Hospital
Rawalpindi

Q. Anjum

Dr. Nasir Khan FCPS
Assistant Professor Radiology
Rawalpindi General Hospital,
Rawalpindi,

N. Khan



**METROPOLITAN
POLICE**

Working together for a safer London

SO15 COUNTER TERRORISM COMMAND

Metropolitan Police SO15 Counter Terrorism Command

New Scotland Yard

Executive Summary

Assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto

Liaquat Bagh Rawalpindi Pakistan

27th December 2007

the security of the event further. A code of conduct was apparently agreed which included the following points:

- The function was to end before nightfall (approximately 1730 hours);
- No vehicles, other than Police and official PPP vehicles, would be permitted in the vicinity of Liaquat Bagh;
- All the main junctions around the venue would be blocked by a Police cordon to allow rapid, unhindered vehicular access;
- The buses containing PPP supporters would be parked some distance away from the venue, with passengers having to make the remainder of the journey on foot; and
- General expectations of both the Police and PPP.

24. SSP Yaseen has provided details of the security arrangements carried out on 26th December 2007. He stated that Police Officers searched all the hotel rooms overlooking Liaquat Bagh and recorded the names and addresses of all those with room reservations for the relevant period. The Officer also stated that a fingertip search was carried out within the park and that it was guarded by armed Police Officers overnight.

25. On the day of the rally, sniffer dogs were deployed inside the park and a further fingertip search was conducted around the stage area. Entry to the park was via three walk through security gates, each equipped with metal

detectors. Two gates were designated for males and the third for females. One Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) was responsible for managing the security procedure at the gates. Each gate was staffed by one Inspector, ten Constables and four Special Branch Officers – a total of forty six Police Officers. The gates opened at 0900 hours and SSP Yaseen stated that everyone, including PPP officials, were physically searched before they entered the park.

26. SSP Yaseen stated that there was a Police Constable positioned every fifteen feet within an inner cordon around the perimeter fence. This was to deter people jumping over the fence or throwing objects into the park with a view to retrieving them later. SSP Yaseen also stated that for practical policing purposes, the park was spilt into two sectors with each sector policed by one Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP); two Inspectors and sixty Constables – a total of one hundred and twenty six Officers.
27. In addition to the inner cordon, SSP Yaseen stated that ninety Constables, under the supervision of one Inspector and a DSP, were deployed along Liaquat Road from Liaquat *Chowk* to the outer gates near the water tower.
28. SSP Yaseen further stated that eighteen Police snipers were deployed on various rooftops surrounding the venue.

As well as being armed with rifles, some were equipped with binoculars.

29. A total of one thousand three hundred Punjab Police Officers were drafted in to Rawalpindi that day specifically to Police the PPP rally. DIG Saud stated that the number of Police Officers on duty was unprecedented for such an event.
30. The podium on the stage from which Ms Bhutto was to address the rally was bullet proof and, in addition, an eight foot high chain link fence was erected one hundred and eighty feet from the stage. That created a sterile area in which no one was permitted to enter. As well as a number of PPP security personnel, the stage area was guarded by twelve Punjab Police 'Elite' Commandos under the supervision of an Inspector. The only access to the stage was from the grounds of the art college via a set of custom built wooden steps.

27th December 2007

31. The PPP rally was attended by people from all over Pakistan. The majority had travelled in buses that were parked some distance away, with the party faithful having to make the final kilometre or two on foot. It is estimated that between fifteen and twenty thousand people had gathered inside Liaquat Bagh to hear Ms Bhutto's address.

32. At about 1415 hours, responsibility for the security of Ms Bhutto's convoy travelling to Liaquat Bagh was taken up by a mobile detachment of Punjab Police 'Elite' commandos at the Faisalabad / Rawalpindi district limits. The 'Elite' detachment consisted of a Traffic Police 'pilot' jeep, the Commanding Officer's jeep and three Toyota Hi Lux pick up vehicles, each containing five Police Officers armed with a variety of weapons, including Kalashnikov AK47 rifles and 9mm automatic handguns.
33. Major Imtiaz was responsible for Ms Bhutto's private convoy and was travelling with her in the white armour plated Toyota Land Cruiser along with the driver and five of her close associates. There were four other PPP security vehicles in the convoy, each containing a number of armed plain clothes security guards.
34. The journey through Rawalpindi was uneventful until the point the convoy reached the outer gates of Liaquat Bagh. The Toyota Land Cruiser slowed down and Miss Bhutto emerged from the roof escape hatch to acknowledge and wave at PPP supporters who had gathered at the gates. Slogans were exchanged between Ms Bhutto and the crowd before the vehicle entered the park.
35. The convoy then drove through the two security gates to the rendezvous point at the rear of the stage, near to the specially constructed wooden stairs. After briefing her staff, Ms Bhutto went straight to the podium and began

addressing the crowd. The vehicles remained in the VIP parking area throughout the rally.

36. Both the Police and PPP officials agree that at one point there was a disagreement over the manner of the policing of the event. After a short stand off, co-operation was restored and the rally continued without further incident.

Security Arrangements Post Rally

37. For security purposes, the Police Officer in charge of the event insisted that the rally finish before 1730 hours (dusk). The PPP adhered to the edict and shortly after 1700 hours Ms Bhutto finished her address. She and other party workers left the stage via the temporary wooden steps. After briefly speaking to members of her entourage, Ms Bhutto got into her armour plated Toyota Land Cruiser motor vehicle.
38. The imported left hand drive vehicle was built to Ms Bhutto's specification by a specialist armour conversion company based in the United Arab Emirates. The 2008 (latest) specification Toyota Land Cruiser was fitted with 'B6' armour that was designed to withstand gunfire and certain bomb blasts. The vehicle was also fitted with two purpose built escape hatches. The first was the standard escape hatch fitted to the rear; the other was an 'optional extra' fitted to the roof of the vehicle. The roof hatch was designed and fitted to provide an alternative means of

emergency escape in the event of the rear door hinges becoming buckled following exposure to a bomb blast, gunfire or a road traffic accident. The roof hatch was not designed for anything other than a means of escape.

39. The hatch is measured at sixty three centimetres in length, sixty three centimetres in width and a depth of nine centimetres. The depth is in the form of a lip constructed of armoured plates and finished in a fine layer of upholstery.
40. The vehicle, registration number BF7772, is an eight seat Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV) and was imported under licence to Pakistan in November 2007. It is fitted with a lightweight aerodeck roof rack upon which two large loud speakers are fitted – front and back. A microphone for the public address system had been fitted to the dashboard at the front of the vehicle.
41. With all the occupants in their vehicles, the convoy prepared for the relatively short journey to Ms Bhutto's home in Islamabad. The PPP convoy was exactly the same as that which had driven to the rally. Police security was again supplied by the 'Elite' commando detachment. Before setting off, the 'Elite' commander recalls reminding both his staff and the PPP security officials of the paramount need for a quick get away from the car park.

42. The occupants of the Land Cruiser comprised of Major Imtiaz, the driver, Ms Bhutto and five of her closest confidants. All the occupants entered the vehicle conventionally apart from the extreme rear seat passengers, who all entered via the rear escape hatch. Ms Bhutto sat in the middle of the rear seat.
43. The planned route for the convoy was to turn right out of Liaquat Bagh into Liaquat Road and then left into Murree Road. According to SSP Yaseen all subsequent roads to the boundary between Rawalpindi and the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) had also been cleared of traffic. At that point the Islamabad Police would have taken over the security of the convoy.
44. Before the official convoy embarked on its journey to Islamabad, a senior PPP member left the VIP car park a few seconds earlier in a white Toyota Prado motor vehicle and turned right into Liaquat Road.

The Incident

45. The Police traffic 'pilot' and 'Elite' command vehicle emerged from the outer gate of Liaquat Bagh and turned right into Liaquat Road. They were followed by two of Ms Bhutto's convoy – a Mercedes Benz and an estate vehicle. Three Punjab Police 'Elite' Toyota Hi Lux pick up vehicles were positioned around the exit of Liaquat Park to receive Ms Bhutto's Land Cruiser and her back up vehicles.

46. At about 1710 hours Ms Bhutto's Land Cruiser emerged slowly from Liaquat Bagh and began to turn right into Liaquat Road. As it approached the central reservation it slowed further and became surrounded by a crowd of predominantly PPP supporters. At the same time those inside the park began climbing over the fence and added to the numbers around the vehicle.
47. The planned quick get away was not occurring, much to the alarm of DIG Saud. He recalled contacting SSP Yaseen via radio in an attempt to establish the cause of the delay. At the same time the 'Elite' commanding officer stated he also became concerned and stepped out of his vehicle and began walking back towards the outer gates, also in an attempt to establish the cause of the delay.
48. Whilst the Land Cruiser slowly approached the central reservation, the crowd began chanting slogans such as, *'Long live Bhutto'*, which were audible to those inside the vehicle. Ms Bhutto waved to the crowd in response and at the same time was enthusing how well the rally had gone. She particularly praised two of her aides for their roles in organising and managing the event.
49. The crowd had swelled in numbers to a few hundred and Ms Bhutto apparently stated, "I should stand up". It is not clear by whom, but one of the occupants in the second

row in the rear of the vehicle deployed the heavy mechanism of the roof escape hatch and opened it.

50. Before she stood up, Ms Bhutto asked one of the occupants to shout slogans at the crowd using the vehicle's public address (PA) system. The microphone was on a long enough lead for it to be passed from the front to the rear of the vehicle. Ms Bhutto stood up on the seat and emerged from the hatch; her head and shoulders were clearly visible. The hatch's two steel armoured plates flanked her left and right sides and were also clearly visible.
51. At the time, Ms Bhutto was wearing a purple dress, a brown *pashmena* shawl across her shoulders, her customary white silk *dopata* (head scarf) and garlands around her neck. She was also holding tissues in her right hand and was occasionally dabbing her nose. One of the occupants of the vehicle recalled that it had been a particularly cold day.
52. Whilst Ms Bhutto waved at the crowd, the PA announcer began shouting slogans in Urdu, '*Cheers for Bhutto*'. The crowd responded by shouting, '*Long live Bhutto*'.
53. It is not clear why, but because the vehicle was not making the intended swift progress, it became surrounded by alert PPP security guards. Two security staff climbed onto the rear bumper and protected the rear, near and

offsides. Guards also took up positions at the front near and offsides.

54. At one point there was a minor scuffle at the nearside of the vehicle when a young PPP supporter climbed onto the running board, apparently with the intention of touching Ms Bhutto. He was forcibly pulled away by PPP security personnel.
55. Immediately after the scuffle, a dark haired male wearing sunglasses, and who had been mingling in the crowd edged towards the vehicle. As he did so, he looked towards Ms Bhutto and, for a short period, positioned himself at the front of the vehicle on the nearside. He then repositioned himself where there were fewer people in the crowd. Having reached the point between the front and rear passenger doors on the nearside of the Land Cruiser, he produced a black automatic handgun and held it in his right hand.
56. The vehicle continued to make slow progress and began to angle away from the gunman as it turned right into Liaquat Road. From a distance of no more than two or three feet, he raised the weapon and fired three shots in quick succession in the general direction of Ms Bhutto. After each discharge of the weapon the gunman changed the position of his gun hand. The three shots were fired in less than one second.

57. There appeared to be correlation of movement between the firing of the second shot and the movement of the rear of Ms Bhutto's *dopata* and hair upwards. She did not start to move downward into the vehicle until after the third shot was fired. Her movement appeared to be downward but with a head movement inclined slightly forward and to the right side.
58. Having fired the shots, the gunman lowered his right arm back to his side and looked downwards towards the ground. At that point the explosive device was detonated. The blast was in the form of an orange flash accompanied by a sharp, loud bang and black acrid smoke.
59. There did not appear to be anyone between the gunman and the vehicle at the time of the detonation. Ms Bhutto was out of sight below the top of the lip of the escape hatch for less than one second prior to the detonation.
60. At the point of detonation, the Land Cruiser was moving forward more quickly but still turning away from the gunman. His final position at the time of detonation was at a point at the junction between the nearside and rear of the vehicle. He appeared to be positioned within two or three feet from the vehicle at all times.
61. Witness 'A' inside the Land Cruiser recalled Ms Bhutto 'flopping' down from the escape hatch at about the same time as the blast. He stated she was initially in a kneeling

position on the seat and then fell sideways into witness 'B's' lap. She lay in a foetal position with her left hand resting on her left leg and her right arm outstretched towards the rear offside door.

62. Witness 'A' also recalled a huge impact on the nearside of the vehicle at the time of the blast. He recalled the vehicle rocking but was not aware of any surge in air pressure or vacuum following the blast. He did however feel something impacting on his left leg and left shoulder.

63. Witness 'C' recalled hearing three shots ringing out and shortly afterwards Ms Bhutto fell down into the vehicle quickly, rather than in a controlled movement. She ended up with the right side of her head resting on his witness 'B's' lap. He heard witness 'B' say, "please get up, what's happened?" Witness 'C' immediately felt that something "bad had happened". At that point he saw blood on his witness 'B's' lap.

64. Major Imtiaz stated that just before the shooting and explosion, he was becoming anxious at the convoy's lack of progress. He was particularly concerned at the size of the crowd gathering around the vehicle. He attempted to contact DIG Saud and SSP Yaseen by cell phone to highlight his concerns, but without success. The Major recalled the traffic 'pilot' vehicle being ahead and stationary outside the Akbar Hotel in Liaquat Road.

65. Major Imtiaz could not recall precisely when Ms Bhutto stood up as he was concentrating on his own task. However, he suddenly heard three or four shots and recalled Ms Bhutto falling down after the second or third shot. He did not see exactly how she fell but stated the shots were immediately followed by a huge explosion, which rocked the vehicle. After the explosion he turned around and saw Ms Bhutto lying down with her head on witness 'B's' lap. He recalled witness 'B' crying out, "BB has been hurt".
66. Witness 'A' recalled there being a lot of dark smoke around the vehicle and it then being driven off. He also noticed that Ms Bhutto was not moving and saw that blood was trickling from her left ear. Witness 'B' was crying and at one point stated, "BB's bleeding". Witness 'C' also called out to Ms Bhutto, but without response.
67. Apart from Ms Bhutto, none of the other occupants of the vehicle received any serious injury during the blast. Witness 'C' received some minor scratches on his head from flying glass and witness 'A' bruised his left shoulder and left leg. The remainder were unscathed.
68. The driver managed to manoeuvre the vehicle away and made progress along Liaquat Road, where he picked up the Police traffic pilot and the 'Elite' commander's vehicle. The occupants of those vehicles were aware there had been an explosion but, according to the 'Elite' commander,

were unaware of Ms Bhutto's condition. Initially they were the only three vehicles in the convoy, but were later caught up by two other 'Elite' Toyota Hi Lux pick ups. The remaining vehicles had been caught up in the blast and were immovable.

69. The 'Elite' commander stated that the convoy turned left into Murree Road and headed towards Islamabad. He recalled the road being clear due to the well worked original Rawalpindi Police plan to provide the convoy an unhindered passage to the ICT boundary.
70. As the convoy headed along Murree Road, it became clear to those inside the Toyota Land Cruiser that Ms Bhutto had suffered a serious injury. At the same time it was becoming increasingly difficult for the driver to manoeuvre the badly damaged vehicle, especially as all four tyres had been punctured and he was effectively driving on the alloy wheel rims.
71. It is not clear by whom but contact was made with the PPP member, who, as stated, had left the rally in a Toyota Prado just before the convoy. The official agreed to meet the damaged Land Cruiser with the intention of transferring Ms Bhutto to the Prado and conveying her to the nearest hospital. By this time the convoy had passed Rawalpindi General Hospital, which is located on the east side of Murree Road (the other side from which the convoy was travelling). It would have been impossible to

turn right into the Hospital grounds, as Murree Road at that stretch is separated by a large concrete central reservation.

72. The Land Cruiser continued along Murree Road and performed a U turn at Rehmanabad Chowk. It pulled up a short distance later at Sadiq Ahmed Bus Stop, where it was joined by the Toyota Prado. Ms Bhutto was carefully placed onto the rear seat of the Prado, and the vehicle made its way towards Rawalpindi General Hospital. Also in the Prado with the PPP official and driver were Major Imtiaz and three of the occupants of the Land Cruiser.
73. The journey to the hospital was extremely slow because the Prado was travelling in the heavy traffic that had built up as a result of various junctions having been blocked to allow the convoy a clear road on the opposite carriageway. This accounts for the relatively long journey time from the scene of the incident to the hospital.

Rawalpindi General Hospital

74. Rawalpindi General Hospital is located in Murree Road, approximately three kilometres from Liaquat Bagh. The hospital is comparatively modern and has a range of facilities including a well equipped Accident and Emergency Department. According to Dr Habib Ahmad Khan, the hospital's Medical Superintendent, special contingencies were in place on 27th December due to two

major political rallies taking place in Rawalpindi that day. Extra staff were on duty, despite the hospital not being under obligation to supplement resources.

75. Ms Bhutto arrived at the Accident and Emergency Department at 1735 hours. She was placed on to a stretcher in the car park and carried into the resuscitation room where she was initially treated by Dr Saeeda Yasmin. Staff in the resuscitation room were extremely busy treating victims of the shooting that had occurred at the PML N rally earlier that day. It is also worth mentioning that five people were killed by gunfire during that event, but there is no suggestion, or indeed, evidence linking the two incidents.
76. Dr Saeeda was not immediately aware of Ms Bhutto's identity but recalled one of her entourage shouting "It's Benazir - save her!" Dr Saeeda noted that Ms Bhutto was pale, unconscious and not breathing. Her pupils were fixed, dilated and did not react to light. There was also a wound to her right temporoparietal region from which blood was trickling. Dr Saeeda described the wound as a 'boggy' mass and noted that there was whitish material visible within it. The patient's clothing, especially on the right side, was soaked in blood.
77. Dr Saeeda immediately began cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Ms Bhutto. She also noticed that there was blood mixed with secretions present in the patient's

throat. The material was suctioned out before Ms Bhutto was intubated with an endotracheal tube. She was also ventilated by way of an Ambu bag. External cardiac compressions were started and, with difficulty, a cannula was placed into the back of her right hand from which intravenous fluids were injected. Dr Saeeda also noticed that there was blood trickling from both the patient's ears and nose.

78. Dr Aurangzeb Khan, the senior registrar, entered the resuscitation room at this time. He assisted Dr Saeeda and also examined the wound on the right side of Ms Bhutto's head. Four layers of light anti septic gauze were placed over the wound. Neither doctor noticed any other injuries on the patient.
79. There was no improvement in Ms Bhutto's condition so it was decided by Dr Aurangzeb to transfer her to the emergency operating theatre. The medical staff continued to perform emergency life support treatment whilst Ms Bhutto was being stretchered upstairs to the operating theatre. Once inside the room she was treated by Dr Aurangzeb and his team of anaesthetists and nurses.
80. Dr Aurangzeb had been made aware of the patient's identity and the fact that there had been an incident following the rally in Liaquat Bagh. He specifically recalled reports of an explosion and that shots had been fired. He also reported a commotion around Ms. Bhutto whilst she

was being transferred to the operating theatre. Dr Aurangzeb's team continued applying emergency treatment in the form of external cardiac massage. He also reported that there was no pulse present in either the patient's carotid or femoral arteries. Whilst attempting to resuscitate Ms Bhutto, Dr Aurangzeb noticed that there was still blood oozing from the wound on the right side of her temple.

81. At 1750 hours, Professor Mohammed Mussadiq Khan entered the Operating Theatre. He had been summonsed to the hospital from his nearby clinic, located about two kilometres away.
82. When Prof Mussadiq entered the operating theatre, he saw Dr Aurangzeb carrying out external heart massage on the patient. After receiving a briefing on Ms Bhutto's condition, the professor took over the external heart massage from Dr Aurangzeb. He recalled carrying out the heart massage from the patient's left side. At the time Dr Ashad, who had also joined the medical team, was ventilating Ms Bhutto and continually checking her carotid pulse, alternating between the left and right sides. Dr Aurangzeb continued to check her femoral pulse but neither doctor felt anything from either artery.
83. At that point Prof Massadiq decided to carry out open cardiac massage on Ms Bhutto. The professor made an incision in her chest and commenced open heart massage

at 1757 hours. No blood was seen in the left thoracic cavity or the pericardium and neither was there any cardiac muscular activity seen.

84. Shortly after Prof Massadiq commenced the open heart massage, Dr Qudsiya Anjum Qureshi entered the operating theatre and took responsibility for the ventilation procedure. She was followed into the room a few moments later by Professor Azam Yusuf. Both had been summonsed to the hospital from nearby homes and workplaces respectively.
85. Dr Qudsiya continually checked for a pulse but to no avail. At one point she was asked to place an intravenous needle into the patient's neck but before doing so she removed two lockets from Ms Bhutto's neck. She did not see any injuries around the patient's neck at that stage. She also noticed that Ms Bhutto was wearing an earring in her right ear but nothing in her left ear. Dr Qudsiya also noticed blood oozing from both the patient's ears, but more so from the right ear. Blood was also trickling from Ms Bhutto's nostrils and the wound on the right side of her temple was bleeding profusely.
86. Prof Massadiq continued to perform open heart massage but without success. Ms Bhutto was administered intra cardiac adrenaline and calcium gluconate. The drugs along with sodium bicarbonate were also repeatedly administered intravenously. In between administering the

intra cardiac adrenaline, Prof Massadiq carried out two defibrillations, whilst Dr Aurangzeb continued the open heart massage. There was no cardiac response to the treatment. Ms Bhutto's pupils remained fixed and dilated and there was no evidence of any cardiac or respiratory activity; nor did the ECG show any activity.

87. At 1816 hours Prof Massadiq consulted the medical team and it was decided, collectively, to stop resuscitation. At that point Ms Bhutto was declared dead. The thoractomy wound was closed by Prof's Massadiq and Yusuf who, whilst doing so, noticed a fractured rib due to resuscitative thoractomy. With the patient having been pronounced dead, Prof Massadiq ordered all males present in the room to leave as a mark of respect.
88. Dr Qudsiya was given the responsibility of cleaning the blood and body tissue from Ms Bhutto's head, neck and upper body. Dr Qudsiya was also given the responsibility of thoroughly checking Ms Bhutto's body for any further signs of injury. Apart from the large wound to the side of her head and the thoractmy wound, nothing else was apparent. When she removed the endtracheal tube from the patient's mouth, she noticed secretions in Ms Bhutto's throat.
89. At one point Dr Aurangzeb re-entered the room and assisted in levering Ms Bhutto's body up to allow Dr Qudsiya to continue examining it. He describes placing his

hands around the back of the patient's head in order to steady it. Again, apart from the large wound on the right side of her temple he too did not notice any other injury on Ms Bhutto.

90. All Ms Bhutto's clothing was removed and handed to her personal maid. The 'missing' earring was discovered amongst the clothing and was also handed to the maid along with the two necklaces that had been removed earlier by Dr Qudsiya. The *dopata* and garlands were not amongst the items handed to the maid and their whereabouts are unknown. Ms Bhutto was redressed in surgical clothing.
91. At no point during her treatment was Ms Bhutto's hair cut, although Professor Khan pointed out that had she undergone brain surgery, part or all of her head would have been shaved.
92. With Ms Bhutto's body having been cleaned and redressed, Dr's Aurangzeb and Qudsiya placed further dressings to the wound on the right side of her temple. Whilst doing so, Dr Aurangzeb felt an irregular, jagged bone pattern around the wound. He also noticed a white / grey matter seeping through the initial gauze dressing that had been applied by Dr Saeeda.
93. At about 1900 hours, Professors Mussadiq and Yusuf discussed the ramifications of Ms Bhutto's continued

presence at the hospital. They decided to carry out an X-ray on Ms Bhutto's head and also made arrangements for the security of her body pending its release to her family, or for an autopsy.

94. Given the chaotic and increasingly volatile atmosphere inside the hospital, there was no chance of transferring Ms Bhutto from the operating theatre to another part of the complex. In fact, so serious was the overcrowding inside the A&E department, that blood and emergency equipment had to be carried up a makeshift bamboo ladder from the outside of the building to a small balcony adjacent to the emergency operating theatres.
95. As far as X-raying Ms Bhutto is concerned, she remained in the emergency operating theatre whilst radiographer Ghafoor Jadd took two X-rays of her skull using a portable X-ray machine. Mr Ghafoor developed the X-rays himself and his supervisor, Dr Munir Ahmed, wrote Ms Bhutto's name at the bottom left side of each print. Mr Ghafoor handed the images to Prof Mussadiq who sealed them in a brown envelope. The continuity and movement of the developed X-rays at the hospital appears to have been satisfactory. The findings of the X-rays are outlined in the medical notes as follows:

'Comminuted depressed skull fracture involving right temporoparietal bone is observed with inwards depressed fracture fragment measuring approximately 35 mm (on X-

ray measurement). Depressed fracture fragment distant from intact bony skull measures 12 mm from outer to outer skull table and 12 mm from inner to inner skull table. Two to three tiny radio densities underneath fracture segment are observed on both projections. Associated scalp soft tissue swelling & moderate degree of pneumocephalus is observed. Rest of bony skull is intact. Radio-opaque dental fillings are evident.'

96. It is worthy of note that the reason a portable X-ray machine was used was because the radiography unit at the hospital does not operate on a 24 hour basis and was closed that evening. It would also have been impossible to transfer Ms Bhutto to the radiology department for the reasons outlined above.
97. Ms Bhutto's death certificate (number 202877) was completed and signed by Dr Aurangzeb. He recorded the cause of death as '*To be ascertained by autopsy.*' Her body remained in the emergency operating room until it was placed in a wooden coffin and removed from the hospital at about 2235 hours that evening. Ms Bhutto's body was signed for by her personal assistant and throughout that time a number of senior PPP members and close confidants remained with it.
98. The following day the seven physicians who had treated Ms Bhutto met in Medical Superintendent Dr Khan's office and compiled medical notes, which were signed by each

individual. It was not possible for the doctors to have compiled their notes the previous evening as they were still attempting to save lives and treating the victims of the Liaquat Bagh bombing.

Scene Control and Initial Examination

99. Video footage, still photography and eyewitness accounts reveal a scene of utter chaos and confusion in the moments following the blast. Whilst this is quite understandable in the immediate aftermath and during the evacuation of the dead and injured, there was never any subsequent organised or structured scene control or forensic examination. The dead and injured were taken to two nearby hospitals – the Rawalpindi General Hospital and the nearby District Headquarters Hospital.
100. Twenty four people, including Ms Bhutto and the suspected bomber, were killed in the blast and ninety one injured. At the time of compiling this report a number of victims remain in various hospitals receiving treatment for serious injuries, including loss of limbs and internal damage.
101. Following the evacuation of the dead and injured, the blast affected Police and PPP vehicles were transported to the Rawalpindi Police Lines and kept undercover. An armed guard was posted to the vehicles.

102. According to senior Police Officers present, the scene was searched for approximately forty five minutes following the blast and only seventeen exhibits were recovered, including the following:

- The bomber's face. Recovered approximately one hundred and twenty feet east of the epicentre of the blast near the main pedestrian entrance to the park. (Exhibit BAGH/1)
- One henna tattooed severed right hand. Recovered close to the face listed above. (Exhibit BAGH/2)
- One severed right hand. Recovered from near the second outer gate. (Exhibit BAGH/3)
- One henna tattooed severed left hand. Recovered from the front garden of Dr Asma Tanveer's house in Liaquat Road. (Exhibit BAGH/4)
- One pair of legs severed at mid-thigh, found lying near the epicentre of the blast. Both have identical brown size 42 'Servis' sandals, matching socks and fragments of blue material around the ankles. (Exhibit Legs No 2(A) and (B))
- One piece of skull. Recovered from the roof of a two-storey house adjacent to the PPP Office on the north side of Liaquat Road. (Exhibit RABH/703)

- One Steyr M9 9mm handgun, with what appears to be a pellet embedded in its magazine that contained five rounds of ammunition. Recovered from the road close to the point of detonation. (Exhibit RABH/201)
- One Mauser .30 Calibre handgun. Recovered outside the second outer gate. (Exhibit RABH/101)
- One damaged magazine containing six .30 calibre live cartridges. Recovered next to the .30 calibre handgun. (Exhibit RABH/500)
- One spent .30 Calibre cartridge case. Recovered near the second outer gate. (Exhibit RABH/401)
- One damaged bullet casing, without percussion cap. Recovered from same roof top upon which the piece of skull was recovered. (Exhibit RABH/301)
- One piece of circuitry. Recovered to the right of the second outer gates. (Since identified as originating from the Toyota Land Cruiser and formed no part of the explosive device). (Exhibit RABH/1)
- One damaged Sony Ericsson mobile telephone. Recovered from the road surface close to the epicentre of the blast. (Since examined and identified as belonging to an innocent victim). (Exhibit RABH/704)

- Two steel pellets recovered near the epicentre of the blast. (Exhibit RABH/600)
- A number of identity and business cards. Recovered throughout the scene. (The cards appear to be from the wallet of an innocent victim). (Exhibit RABH/718)
- The remains of a jacket recovered from the road surface near to the point of detonation. (The jacket belongs to an innocent victim of the incident). (Exhibit RABH/702)

103. It is important to point out that the above locations are those shown on the plan created by Police Officer SHO Kashif at the time the exhibits were recovered on 27th December 2007. The locations are not necessarily those at which the exhibits ended up following the explosion. Photographs taken in the immediate aftermath of the blast suggest that .30 calibre Mauser handgun, at least, had originally ended up near the epicentre.

104. As far as the exhibit numbers are concerned, those with the prefix 'RABH' are items that were transferred into the possession of the New Scotland Yard Officers for forensic examination in the UK. The remaining exhibit numbers refer to items that remained in the possession of the Pakistan authorities.

105. There was no forensic examination of the scene that evening. A senior Police Officer present recollected the growing hysteria and anger of the gathering crowd. Word had got through that Ms Bhutto had been injured, which had added to the antagonistic atmosphere. The Officer had also received reports of people daubing themselves in the victims' blood, believing it to have been Ms Bhutto's. Whilst it is not absolutely clear, it is believed the senior Officer feared a total break down of law and order, which led directly to the request for the local fire service to hose down the scene. They immediately obliged and the scene was cleaned within an hour of the bomb blast. The opportunity for a thorough forensic examination was lost.
106. A limited forensic examination of the scene was, however, carried over the following two days. This was obviously in an uncontrolled environment and little of any value was recovered.

Video and Other Media Footage

- 107 The PPP rally at Liaquat Bagh was covered by both national and international media. Video footage and photographs of the actual event, including Ms Bhutto's speech, are of excellent quality. However, when the rally concluded and Ms Bhutto began her journey to Islamabad, there were only a few film crews and photographers in Liaquat Road.

108. Most of the footage that captures the shooting and bomb blast is of poor quality but nevertheless appears conclusive. The gunman can be seen from a number of angles approaching the vehicle, aiming the gun with his right hand and firing three shots. It is not clear from any of the footage whether any shots struck Ms Bhutto.
109. The SO15 Counter Terrorism Command CCTV Unit was responsible for analysing relevant visual media that has assisted in establishing the events leading to Ms Bhutto's assassination.
110. It was established that there was no CCTV coverage of the rally in Liaquat Bagh or of the exit route of Ms Bhutto's motorcade into Liaquat Road. The absence of CCTV in the vicinity of the attack diminished the ability to identify fully, through analysis of visual media, the *modus operandi* of those potentially responsible. The process would usually include a review of the suspect(s) arrival and preparation at the location, including any historical reconnaissance.
111. The subsequent review of visual media has been restricted to the available material recorded or obtained by News agencies covering the event and who were positioned in Liaquat Road when Ms Bhutto's vehicle emerged from the car park.

112. In total the Unit were provided with twenty two pieces of media footage on DVD or CD disc format. Fourteen of those exhibits were recovered in Pakistan and the additional eight in the UK. Only one of these contains original unedited footage of the attack site prior to or during the incident and has been provided by Channel 4 News in the UK. The other twenty one items contain various segments of edited footage from three main news agencies – Dawn News (Pakistan), Sky News (UK) and Channel 4 News (UK).
113. The excerpts in general terms are of less than a minute in duration and show footage leading up to the gunshots discharged near the Toyota Land Cruiser, the subsequent detonation of the explosive device and the aftermath at the scene.
114. In order to provide the most detailed account of the incident, the Unit endeavoured to synchronise the three main segments of media footage. This was achieved by synchronising the imagery based on shared visual movement in conjunction with one audio track.
115. The compilation of synchronised footage lasts for fifteen seconds and twenty two frames (there are thirty frames in a second). There is no date or time on the media, so a timer has been added on the NTSC format, which is consistent with the footage supplied to the SO15 CCTV

Unit. The key timings of the synchronised footage are as follows:

- 1st shot to 2nd shot: 13 frames (less than half a second);
- 2nd shot to 3rd shot: 10 frames (one third of a second);
- 3rd shot to detonation: 25 frames (just under second);
- 1st shot to last shot: 23 frames (just less than a second);
- 1st shot to detonation: 1 second plus 18 frames (just over one and a half seconds);
- 3rd shot to Ms Bhutto's head disappearing out of view inside the vehicle: 3 frames (one tenth of a second); and
- Ms Bhutto disappearing from sight of camera to detonation of the device: 22 frames (just over two thirds of a second).

116. A DVD compilation as been produced containing the original Channel 4 News material and the synchronised footage highlighted. The footage is captured at 10 speed to allow detailed further analysis if required. The DVD is complemented by an album of still images. The sequence of footage is outlined earlier in this report in paragraphs 55 to 60.

Joint Punjab Police / FIA SIG Investigation

117. The incident was reported via First Instance Report (FIR) 471/07 and the initial investigation was headed by a Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of the Punjab Police. He

was joined a day later by Additional Inspector General (Punjab) Abdul Majid who had been drafted in from Lahore. AIG Majid was appointed the Officer in over all charge of the investigation.

118. The investigation team was made up of Punjab Police CID Officers and personnel from the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) Special Investigation Group (SIG). The team based themselves at the Police Lines in Rawalpindi. The SIG are the agency within the Pakistan law enforcement system with the responsibility for conducting terrorist investigations.
119. One of the first duties of the investigation team was the grim task of assessing the dead and injured. A total of twenty four people were killed in the attack, including Ms Bhutto and the bomber.
120. The Pakistan investigation team managed to identify all but one of the dead – the bomber. All the bodies and body parts, apart from the right hand referred to above, were returned to the victims' next of kin. It must be noted that this process was carried out by visual identification of body and body parts and not via any scientific process such as DNA identification and does not appear to have followed international Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) standards. Nevertheless, analysis of the data in the UK supports the calculation of twenty four dead.

121. SIG Officers attended the scene at Liaquat Bagh and carried out a further search of the area, including scouring elevated buildings and rooftops. Additionally, all the water was removed from drains in a two hundred foot radius of the explosion. Nothing was recovered from the drains but no sifting took place of the large quantity of sediment and sludge that was removed.
122. Major Shafkat Malik, the leading FIA SIG expert on both explosives and ballistics, and other senior SIG Officers delivered a presentation on the construction of suicide vests that had been recovered intact throughout Pakistan. The devices were predominantly made with slabs of high explosive with large numbers of steel pellets pressed in an even pattern into the surface of the explosive. Lengths of detonator cord were then used to link multiple slabs of explosives sewn into the vest. The favoured method of initiating the device was by using a 'Striker Sleeve', which only requires the bomber to pull a small pin out of the sleeve, allowing a spring loaded pin within it to drop down onto a built in detonator. Major Shafkat stated that the 'Striker Sleeves' tended to be of Russian manufacture.

Eyewitness Accounts and Summaries

123. A number of witnesses were interviewed both by Police and the media. Many claim to have witnessed the gunman approaching the vehicle and firing his weapon. At least one witness claims to have seen the gunman himself detonate the explosive device. However, understandably

the accounts given are confused and do not provide absolute clarity.

124. Unlike standard UK police practice, no detailed written accounts have been taken from eyewitnesses by the local investigation team. Some accounts have been given directly to the media and consequently eyewitness accounts have not been relied on to any significant extent by SO15.

SO15 Forensic Examination

125. Upon arrival in Pakistan, the Scotland Yard team was provided unfettered access to the bomb scene at Liaquat Bagh, the blast affected vehicles, body parts stored at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology in Rawalpindi and the District Headquarters Hospital, exhibits held at the FIA SIG Headquarters in Islamabad, the Police Lines in Rawalpindi and the ballistics laboratory in Lahore. A total of one hundred and fifty eight exhibits were gathered by the Scotland Yard team during the investigation.
126. To assist in examining and analysing the dynamics of the bomb blast, three scientists from the UK Forensic Explosives Laboratory (FEL) joined the team and spent three days examining the bomb scene, the blast affected vehicles and X-rays of the suspected bomber's body parts.

127. Three technicians from the Metropolitan Police Computer Modelling Bureau (CMB) also joined the deployment and spent two days conducting detailed photography at the scene in Liaquat Bagh and the Police Lines in Rawalpindi. The purpose of the CMB's presence was to create a three dimensional virtual reality model of the incident.
128. In addition, Ms Bhutto's family have made a number of items available for inspection including her dental records, the clothing worn by her on 27th December 2007, documents and vehicles. The dental records and clothing were flown to the UK for forensic examination and analysis.
129. The Pakistan authorities also gave unprecedented authority for a number of significant exhibits to be handed over to the Scotland Yard team for further analysis in the UK. Exhibits included the two handguns, magazines and ammunition, DNA samples and the original X-ray images taken at Rawalpindi General Hospital on 27th December 2007. Without access to such exhibits, the SO15 ability to conduct a thorough investigation would have been greatly diminished. The team are grateful for the Pakistan Police support in this regard.

Results of Forensic Analysis

DNA Results

130. DNA testing and analysis was carried out on a number of exhibits by the Forensic Science Service (FSS) in London. Profiles that had been obtained from the samples of outstanding body parts in Pakistan were also compared with profiles obtained from the two recovered firearms.
131. The FSS initially carried out DNA analysis on pieces of tissue and samples of blood from within the pieces of flesh taken from the suspected bomber's recovered body parts. The profiles from each body part matched and indicated a male donor and were labelled as 'unknown 2'. The matched profiles included:
- The face mask (exhibit no BAGH/1);
 - The henna tattooed right hand (exhibit no BAGH/2);
 - Two pieces of skull (exhibit no RABH/703 & RABH/63);
 - The pair of legs (exhibit no legs 2(A) & (B)); and
 - One finger (part of exhibit BAGH/2)
132. The term 'unknown 2' originates from the order in which the profile was developed. There is no significance to the term and it is merely the order in which the profile was developed.

133. Despite extensive testing, the FSS were unable to obtain a DNA profile from the henna tattooed left hand (exhibit BAGH/4). One result gave an indication of a male donor but no further reportable discriminating information. More sensitive DNA analysis techniques could have been carried out on these samples, however if a result were obtained, it would not have been directly attributable to the tissue tested. It was therefore concluded that further DNA analysis of this sample would not assist in determining from whom these pieces of skin could be attributed. It is likely that the inability to obtain a profile is due to the degradation of the sample.
134. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the above, an identical DNA match was made by the Pakistan forensic scientists, which is significant especially as the henna tattoo designs on both hands appear to be identical. The only outstanding unidentified body part, therefore, is the right hand (exhibit BAGH/3) recovered from near the second outer gate at the vehicular entrance to Liaquat Bagh.
135. The other significant DNA profile was obtained from a piece of body tissue recovered from the inner rim of the aerodeck roof rack on the Toyota Land Cruiser. That profile was referred to as 'unknown 1'. This profile could have come from any of the victims and does not take the investigation any further.

136. DNA profiles were also obtained from the .30 bore Mauser handgun. The dominant profile present on that exhibit was discovered on the hammer and was that of 'unknown 2' – the suspected bomber. However, there were also lesser traces of 'unknown 1's' DNA on the weapon.
137. The DNA results obtained from the Steyr M9 9mm handgun (RABH/201) were unsuitable for meaningful comparisons with reference profiles. It was impossible to say from DNA analysis who had handled the weapon. Similar testing was carried out on both weapons' magazines and cartridges, with the same result.

Fingerprint Analysis

138. The two firearms, magazines, rounds of ammunition and mobile telephone were forwarded to the SO15 Counter Terrorism Command Finger Print Team for a joint DNA and fingerprint examination.
139. A finger mark was chemically developed from the Steyr M9 9mm magazine together with a finger mark similarly lifted from a live round that had been contained in the undamaged magazine of the .30 bore Mauser handgun.
140. Both marks were checked against the fingerprints taken from the three severed hands (exhibits BAGH /2/3/ and 4) with a negative result. No other marks were obtained from any of the other exhibits.

Explosives Experts' Examination

141. As previously stated, three scientists from the UK Forensic Explosive Laboratory (FEL) spent three days in Pakistan examining the scene and blast affected vehicles. One of the scientists also examined the .30 bore Mauser handgun upon returning to the UK.
142. Upon examining the armour plated Toyota Land Cruiser it was noted that the nearside and to a lesser extent, the rear of the vehicle bore a grey sooty residue and hundreds of small holes. Parts of the outer panelling of these areas were distorted, some fitments were missing and the outer panes of glass were missing, apparently broken. The panes of reinforced glass were cracked.
143. The damage to the vehicle had been caused by the explosive device, which had propelled hundreds of spherical balls at high speed. Some of the fragments had penetrated the outer skin and had impacted with the armour plating beneath, leaving indentations. None of the fragments had pierced the armour plating and no parts of the explosive device had entered the interior of the vehicle.
144. The pattern of holes created by the impact of the small fragments indicated that the device was initiated close to the rear nearside panel of the vehicle and slightly behind

it at a distance of between approximately one and two metres and a height of approximately one to one and a half metres. It is also highly unlikely that there was any object of significant weight or thickness, or indeed person, between the explosive device and the vehicle at the time of the initiation of the device.

145. The extent of the damage to the vehicle and nature of injuries to persons in close proximity were caused by the detonation of several kilograms of high explosive. The detonation of such a quantity of high explosive in such close proximity to the vehicle would have caused it to be subject to a violent motion. This would be likely to cause persons and loose objects within the vehicle to move suddenly and unpredictably.
146. As a result of this violent motion to the vehicle it is possible that if a person's head were in the vicinity of a hard metal object, the movement of the vehicle and persons within it in the moments directly following the blast could cause the head to impact with the object with quite some considerable force.
147. As far as the recovered body parts are concerned, the presence of parts of a head and traumatically amputated legs, as were apparent at the scene, have been noted at scenes of suicide bombings in recent years where the suspected suicide bomber is believed to have been wearing a suicide vest. This type of device allows an explosive

charge (usually a high explosive) to be strapped around the chest of the bomber. The damage to the body parts viewed in the photographs is consistent with the use of such a high explosive device.

148. The FEL scientist was also of the opinion that the patterns of holes in the road at the scene were consistent with the suicide bomber wearing an explosive device strapped to their chest and back.
149. The scientist also noted in the photographs of the .30 bore Mauser handgun that there appeared to be body tissue distributed over it. At the time of physically examining the firearm upon returning to London the body tissue had been removed. The presence of the body tissue depicted in the photographs is consistent with the handgun having been in the proximity of an explosion where persons had sustained severe injuries.
150. The damaged .30 calibre magazine (exhibit RABH/500) and damaged .30 calibre cartridge case (exhibit RABH/301) both showed damage consistent with them having been in close proximity to an explosive event. For example it could have been in a pocket of clothing worn by the bomber, or it could have been in a pocket of someone very close (next to) the bomber. It was not possible for the scientist to be more specific.

151. Although it is not possible to be definite, the most likely scenario for the findings of the various explosives is that the device contained a military high explosive such as Composition B or similar, which is a mixture of RDX and TNT, together with a detonating cord, which commonly contains PETN. As noted above however, this is not a definite conclusion, and other scenarios are possible.

Firearms Examination

152. The two firearms, magazines and ammunition were examined at the Forensic Science Service Firearms Department in London.

153. The .30 bore Mauser handgun (exhibit RABH/101) is a Chinese manufactured Tokarev TT54 marked with the export designation M20. There was no serial number immediately identified on the weapon and the markings on the left side of the slide appeared to be spurious. The weapon had a used appearance but was in working order, although attempts at pulling back on the slide without first cocking the hammer, proved difficult.

154. The 7.62x25 (Tokarev) cartridge case (exhibit RABH/301) that was recovered from the roof of the building adjacent to the PPP Office in Liaquat Road was also examined. The cartridge was unfired. There was no bullet or primer in the case, which itself was crushed and deformed. The primer pocket in the base of the cartridge case was clean,

with no evidence that the missing primer had been fired. There was a circular impact mark on the side of the case. The round had suffered an event that had caused the bullet and primer to be ejected from the case without firing. Logically, this event was probably the blast. The markings (38 and 87) on the base of the cartridge indicate that it may be of Soviet manufacture, possibly 1987 production.

155. The empty 7.62x25 cartridge case (exhibit RABH/401) that was recovered from near the second outer gate in Liaquat Road was examined and found to be the same type of ammunition as exhibit RABH/301. This was probably of Chinese (People's Republic) manufacture (marked 311 and 06). Firing marks on the cartridge were compared with test samples from the .30 Mauser and agreement was found between them. This showed that the cartridge case had been fired from the .30 bore Mauser.
156. The deformed cartridge magazine (exhibit RABH/500) that was recovered next to the .30 bore Mauser was of a type that would have been suitable for use with that particular firearm.
157. The cartridges from the magazine contained within the .30 bore Mauser are all the same and carry the headstamp '38' and '88'. This indicates the factory code and year of manufacture. Chinese production is indicated.

158. No examination was carried out on the Steyr M9 9mm handgun, as it is believed to have belonged to one of the PPP security guards and had not been fired.

Dental Records

159. In order to authenticate the X-ray images taken of Ms Bhutto's skull at Rawalpindi General Hospital on 27th December 2007, dental records were obtained from her dentist in Karachi. The dental records included a number of X-ray images taken of Ms Bhutto in 1992. Both the post and ante mortem X-ray images were forwarded to a forensic odontologist in London for comparison.

160. The odontologist concluded that in view of the demonstrable similarities between the dental treatment recorded ante mortem by her dentist in Karachi and the dental treatment extracted from the post mortem lateral skull radiograph, and in the absence of any incompatibilities, it was his opinion that the radiographic images are of the same individual, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.

Radiographers Report

161. The X-rays of Ms Bhutto's skull that were taken at Rawalpindi General Hospital on 27th December 2007 were examined by a radiographer at Addenbrook's Hospital, Cambridge.

162. The radiographer noticed that there was a depressed fracture in the right temporoparietal region of the skull with main fragment measuring forty millimetres in size with depression by approximately thirteen millimetres. There was no evidence of any bony injury affecting the left side of the skull.
163. The lateral view showed high density rounded areas, and their appearances are in keeping with artefacts (smudges) created at the time of processing the films. Some of the smaller ones (less than two millimetres) could possibly be shrapnel representing tiny shards of blast material but none of these represent ball bearings and there is no evidence of a bullet.
164. The cervical spine was only imaged on the lateral view from C1 to the mid portion of C5 and no fracture or dislocation was seen on this single projection. In the absence of a full radiograph series to evaluate a potential neck injury, the possibility of a cervical fracture lower down could not be discounted.
165. The radiographer concluded that the appearance of the fracture strongly suggested a blow to the right side of Ms Bhutto's head. There are no features to suggest a bullet entry or exit point. The extent of the skull fracture implies that Ms Bhutto must have hit the side of her head against a hard object with great force; it is unlikely she could have

caused this degree of injury by falling a short distance or crouching suddenly. It implies that her head must have been pushed by the blast.

166. The radiographer also viewed the X-rays of the suspected bomber's right hand (exhibit RABH/76). He concluded that the hand was of an individual with an unfused skeleton and had the appearance to suggest that it had come from a teenager. Using the WW Greulich and SI Pyle publication of "Radiographic Atlas of Skeletal Development of the Hand and Wrist" as a point of reference, the radiographer estimated the age of the individual at fifteen years and six months. This calculation is caveated by the standard deviation of 12.86 months.
167. An assessment was also made of the lower limbs (Legs No 2(A) and (B)) that are suspected of belonging to the bomber. They clearly come from an individual who is skeletally immature. Although not able to formally age the bones, the radiographer concluded that the degree of skeletal maturity was consistent with the legs belonging to the same individual in exhibit RABH/76.

Defence Science & Technology Laboratory (DSTL) Report

168. A senior scientist from DSTL was tasked by SO15 with providing a report into the potential injury mechanisms to Ms Bhutto and the injury mechanism evident in the

additional body parts recovered from the scene at Liaquat Bagh.

169. In order to assess injury mechanisms, the scientist was supplied with X-ray images both of Ms Bhutto's skull and the suspected bomber's body parts. Copies of media footage and the report from the FEL were also made available.
170. It was concluded that the injuries to Ms Bhutto were more consistent with a high speed impact with a sharp edged protuberance, such as the impact with the edge of a thick rigid plate and are not consistent with the injuries from a bullet wound. The most likely explanation for the impact to Ms Bhutto's head is from the rapid acceleration of her head and neck complex, due to the blast, followed by a rapid deceleration from impact with a rigid object (probably part of the vehicle structure).
171. The scientist also concluded that the injuries to exhibit Legs No 2(A) & (B) were consistent with blast injuries, but are not consistent with traumatic amputation injuries caused by the detonation of an explosive to the side of the body with the associated shock and blast transmitted through the air and ground.
172. The injuries to the legs are more consistent with vertical loading downward from above associated with a blast and, therefore, it may be concluded that the legs belonged

to a person very close to the explosive, possible even the person wearing the suicide vest.

173. The scientist also concluded that any persons who were in the immediate vicinity of the bomber when the explosive device was detonated would not have survived the blast. This conclusion was drawn having viewed media footage of the scene filmed in the immediate aftermath of the blast, coupled with the evidence of blast dynamics provided by the FEL scientist.

Pathologist's Report

174. The pathologist appointed in this investigation was Dr Nathaniel Cary, an eminent Home Office Registered Consultant Forensic Pathologist, whose casework has included the notorious Soham murders in 2002, the 7th July 2005 terrorist attacks in London and the Litvinenko poisoning in 2006.
175. In order to provide an opinion on the likely circumstances of Ms Bhutto's death, Dr Cary was provided with a number of exhibits and documents including:
- Copies of the X-ray images of Ms Bhutto's skull taken at Rawalpindi General Hospital, together with a report by Dr Nasir Khan describing the nature of the head wound;

- A PowerPoint presentation incorporating findings at the scene of the explosion, including views of the Toyota Land Cruiser in which Ms Bhutto was travelling;
- The forensic odontology report authenticated the skull X-ray images;
- A copy of the report prepared by the scientist from the FEL;
- Video recordings of the events leading up to the explosion; and
- A CD containing digital images of body parts and artefacts suspected to be from the 'suicide bomber'.

176. Dr Cary has come to a number of conclusions based on the information available to him. His findings are highly significant both in establishing the likely cause of Ms Bhutto's death and whether the gunman was also the bomber. Dr Cary's conclusions are included in this report in full.

177. I have carefully considered the possibility that the wound on the right side of the head could be a gunshot entrance wound. Quite apart from the fact that this wound is on the opposite side of the head to that which would be expected from a discharge from the weapon being brandished, in my opinion the external skin wound is much too large and the underlying skull fracturing does not show the typical internal bevelling of an entrance wound. Rather, the lower edge of the skull wound where the depressed fragment has broken away is quite clean cut both externally and internally. In excluding the possibility of an entrance

wound I have taken account of the fact that the bullet from the 0.30 weapon in question would have been in stable flight due to the rifled nature of the barrel. The nature of the skull fracturing is also not in keeping with a 'key-holing' type effect, which may give rise to a larger skin entrance wound in these circumstances. In my opinion the possibility of the wound to the right side of the head being a gunshot entrance wound may be reasonably excluded. Of course if this were a gunshot entrance wound then there is neither evidence of a projectile remaining in the head nor is there any described or X-ray evidence of an exit wound.

178. I have also considered the possibility that the wound on the right side of the head being a gunshot exit wound. Although the location would be more appropriate for the exit of a bullet previously entering approximately from the line of fire from the weapon being brandished, both the nature of the skull fracturing (which would be expected to break outwards rather than inwards) and the absence of any described or X-ray evidence of a corresponding gunshot entrance wound on the left side of the head excludes this as a reasonable possibility.

179. In my opinion the nature and extent of the skull fracturing and of course the fact that the head injury was rapidly fatal are entirely inconsistent with some form of head impact simply as a result of ducking down or falling back into the vehicle in question. In the very small window of

time available, in my opinion the only tenable cause for the rapidly fatal head injury in this case is that it occurred as the result of impact due to the effects of the bomb blast. There are two possible means by which this could have occurred. Firstly the head could have been moved suddenly and rapidly by the 'blast wind' passing across the escape hatch area. Secondly the car could have suddenly and rapidly moved towards the deceased's head. Either of these could have caused forceful impact again with some structure forming a hard edge within the hatch area of the vehicle. These two possible mechanisms are not necessarily mutually exclusive of one another and which of them mainly applied must be largely a matter of academic interest. The important point is that in my opinion there was a very forceful impact between the right side of the deceased's head and the escape hatch area as a direct consequence of the bomb blast.

180. The apparent blood deposits inside the vehicle are consistent with a rapid collapse with profuse bleeding from the right side of the head. The rapid deterioration to a state of cardiac arrest is consistent with a very severe head injury, with bleeding from the ears and the nose suggesting associated basal skull fracturing which would not be unusual in an impact of this severity. There is also the possibility of an associated neck injury, which again would not be unusual in these circumstances. This possibility is not excluded on the basis of the limited X-ray examination of the neck that was carried out.

181. The possibility of a gunshot wound to the mid or lower trunk can be reasonably excluded on the basis of the shielding effect of the vehicle. I cannot absolutely exclude the possibility of a gunshot wound to the upper trunk or neck occurring during the incident. However there is no need to invoke this possibility to account for death given the nature and extent of the head injury present.

182. In my opinion Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto died as a result of a severe head injury sustained as consequence of the bomb blast and due to a head impact somewhere in the escape hatch of the vehicle. Although many victims of bomb blast die due to the effects of shrapnel, or if very close due to the disruptive effects of the blast itself on tissues, there are a whole variety of means by which death may be caused and this is simply an illustration of such an effect.

183. The medical reports and X-radiographs are received from Pakistan in good faith. It has however also been possible to independently confirm that the X-radiographs were indeed from Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto through the forensic odontological examination.

184. The opinions expressed above are based on the limited material available. In the ideal world a full forensic post mortem examination and further analysis of samples would be required to fully investigate this case. However

the reports and observations of the deceased in the A & E department, no doubt made in good faith, together with the observations of all those involved in investigating this case, do in my opinion allow a number of useful conclusions to be drawn and these are described above. It should be born in mind in considering the analysis above that the time frame in which the fatal injury occurred was very short and really only three possibilities need to be considered in these circumstances, namely gunshot wounding or effects from an explosion or a combination.

185. I have also been asked to consider the possibility that the legs, hands and disrupted face illustrated in the material that I have been provided with might belong to a 'suicide bomber. In my opinion the pattern of fragmentation, the charring pattern on the legs and the body disruption (assuming that the body parts can be associated with one another through DNA analysis) are consistent with them being from someone in very close proximity to the explosion and presumptively therefore from a 'suicide bomber'. The charred traumatic amputation of the right index finger of the Henna tattooed right hand raises the distinct possibility that the person who fired the 0.30 pistol might also have been the 'suicide bomber'. The pattern of amputation of the index finger in these circumstances could have arisen with the finger through the trigger guard of the gun. This possibility would appear to be reinforced by the damage to the gun magazine. It might be possible to carry out further work on this

weapon to attempt to determine how close to the gun is likely to have been to the bomb when detonation occurred.

Post Mortem Issues

186. No post mortem examination was carried out on Ms Bhutto at Rawalpindi General Hospital, despite Dr Aurangzeb noting her cause of death as *'To be ascertained by autopsy'*. Establishing the cause of death was not a matter for Dr Aurangzeb and his colleagues; their primary concern was to save Ms Bhutto's life.
187. The legal requirements in Pakistan of when and by whom a post mortem examination is carried out are contained in section 174(3) Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 as amended by Act II 1997, which states:

'When there is any doubt regarding the cause of death, or when for any other reason the police officer considers it expedient so to do, he shall, subject to such rules as the Provincial Government may prescribe in this behalf, forward the body, with a view to its being examined, to the nearest Civil Surgeon, or other qualified medical man appointed in this behalf by the Provincial Government, if the state of the weather and the distance admit of it being so forwarded without risk of such putrefaction on the road as would render such examination useless.'

188. The senior Police Officer on duty at Rawalpindi General Hospital that evening witnessed himself the chaotic and emotional scenes, as described, within the A & E department. It was also apparent that the distinct prospect of a serious disturbance and the potential break down of law and order in the city contributed to his decision to release Ms Bhutto's body without an autopsy having been conducted. The decision was therefore made to release the body to her personal assistant and, as stated, was despite the cause of death not having been established.
189. Ms Bhutto's body was conveyed to the nearby Chaklala Air Force Base in Rawalpindi. Mr Zardari, together with his three children, arrived at Chaklala from Dubai approximately six hours after his wife's death. At the airport there was apparently a discussion between Mr Zardari and a senior Police Officer about the prospect of him consenting to a post mortem being carried out.
190. Mr Zardari declined the request, stating that an autopsy should have been conducted in the preceding six hours. He was also mindful of the effect a post mortem examination would have on his children. Mr Zardari also explained that the family were in a state of shock and grieving heavily, and as a result, wished to bury Ms Bhutto within the customary twenty four hour period.
191. The following day Ms Bhutto's body was prepared for a traditional burial in the family mausoleum in Naudero,

Sindh province. The duty of washing and clothing her fell to a maid and a female relative, who also happens to be a medical practitioner.

192. The relative stated that she and the maid washed Ms Bhutto thoroughly but due to the head wound did not wash her hair, which would have been customary in normal circumstances. She further stated that apart from the severe wound to the right side of Ms Bhutto's head and the incision made by Prof Massadiq on the left side of her chest, there was no other sign of injury. This corroborates the accounts given by Doctors Qudsiya and Aurangzeb.

Conclusion

193. In accordance with the terms of reference, the enquiry team sought to explain the sequence of events from the end of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto's speech through to the pronouncement of her death at Rawalpindi General Hospital. In order to achieve this within a practical timeframe considerable emphasis has been placed on scientific analysis and examination. Whilst other lines of enquiry such as eyewitness testimony have been considered, they have not necessarily been covered to the usual level of detail nor pursued to absolute finality. However I am satisfied that this does not materially affect the ability to reach conclusions within the stated terms of reference.

194. Two principal issues arise. The actual cause of death and whether the attack was carried out by one or two individuals. Turning to the first point of cause of death.
195. In considering this issue there are a number of critical factors. The absence of an autopsy has required considerable emphasis to be placed upon the X-rays taken at Rawalpindi General Hospital following Ms Bhutto's death. Additionally the accounts given by the medical staff involved in her treatment and that of family members who washed the body before burial provide valuable insight.
196. Independent expert comparison of the hospital X-rays with detailed dental X-rays have verified the X-rays taken were indeed of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. The original X-rays have also been examined by a leading radiologist and opinion sought from a leading explosives expert and the eminent Home Office pathologist Dr Nathaniel Cary.
197. There is agreement between all experts that the only apparent injury on the information provided is the major trauma to the right side of the head. They have individually and collectively excluded this injury from being a gunshot entry or exit wound. Given the position of Ms Bhutto immediately prior to the shots being fired and the protection provided by the vehicle, the likelihood of a bullet wound to the mid or lower trunk can also be reasonably excluded.

198. Equally there is agreement between the experts that the injury could not have been caused by Ms Bhutto hitting her head during the course of ducking down into the vehicle. Such an explanation can also be excluded as a reasonable possibility.

199. Given the limited range of the X-ray, the absence of a full post mortem examination and the lack of a CT scan, Dr Cary is quite properly not able to categorically exclude a gunshot wound to the upper trunk or neck. However when taking into account the description given by those who did have close contact with the body, which strongly suggests no such injury was present, there is little evidence to support the possibility of a gunshot wound to the upper trunk or lower neck. Dr Cary does exclude the possibility of a bullet to the neck or upper trunk as a relevant factor in the cause of death given the nature and extent of injury to her head.

200. Examination of the X-rays provided shows a depressed skull fracture to the right temporoparietal region. The main fragment measures 40 millimetres in size with a depression of 13 millimetres. The radiologist also reports seeing no evidence of either a bullet or a ball-bearing being present.

201. The overall view of medical opinion is clearly articulated by Dr Cary who states, "the only tenable cause for the

rapidly fatal head injury in this case is that it occurred as the result of impact due to the effects of the bomb-blast." He goes on to say, "in my opinion Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto died as a result of a severe head injury sustained as a consequence of the bomb-blast and due to head impact somewhere in the escape hatch of the vehicle."

202. In reaching the above conclusion Dr Cary was assisted by DSTL explosives experts. In essence the injury can be explained by either the blast pushing her head into the structure of the vehicle, the structure of the vehicle being pushed into the side of her head or indeed a combination of both. Whilst absolute clarity cannot be established, by far the most likely explanation is that the force of the blast pushed her head into contact with the escape hatch area of the vehicle.
203. It should be noted that high explosives of the type used in this device typically detonate at a velocity between 6000 and 9000 metres per second, such an explosion would cause significantly more than sufficient force to have such an impact when considering the quantities and distances relevant in this case.
204. It is also important to comment on the construction of the vehicle. It was imported to Pakistan under licence from a specialist armoured conversion company. It was fitted with B6 armour and designed to withstand gunfire and bomb-blast. In addition to a standard escape hatch to the

rear, this vehicle was fitted with a second optional escape hatch to the roof. It is an unfortunate and misleading feature of this case, that this escape hatch had been referred to as a sunroof. It is designed and intended solely as a means of escape. Another significant point is that it has a depth of 9 cms; this is in the form of a lip constructed of armoured plate and covered in upholstery.

205. The injury described is entirely consistent with Ms Bhutto's head impacting upon this lip. Detailed analysis of the media footage provides supporting evidence. Her head did not completely disappear from view until two thirds of a second before the blast. The footage also shows her moving forward and to the right as she ducks down into the vehicle. Whilst her exact head position at the time of the blast can never be ascertained, the overwhelming conclusion must be that she did not manage to get her head entirely below the lip of the escape hatch by the time of the blast resulting in the injury described and her tragic death.

206. In the light of the terms of reference and having considered all of the above together with the significant sensitivities, I have concluded that to request an exhumation and autopsy would be disproportionate. I am satisfied that whilst clearly desirable, such an examination would not materially alter the above findings, therefore no such request will be made by the New Scotland Yard team.

207. Moving to the second issue, there has been some speculation that two individuals were involved in the attack, in that one suspect fired the shot and the second suspect detonated the device. The following paragraphs seek to address this point but it is important to note this relates to the immediacy of the attack and does not and cannot provide any detail of how many suspects were involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of the attack either on the day itself or the preceding period.

208. Whilst the lack of a recognised disaster victim identification process is an issue, all the evidence indicates only one body remains unidentified. This body consists of the face, legs and henna tattooed hands, discussed in detail earlier in this report. DNA analysis has linked these parts as being from the same individual and expert opinion provides strong evidence that they originate from the suicide bomber. Additionally, there is evidence to suggest the severing of the finger of the right hand may be consistent with it having been in a trigger guard at the time of the explosion.

209. Analysis of the media footage shows the movement of the suspect with the handgun and of particular importance, the vehicle. It places the suspect at the rear of the vehicle and looking down immediately before the explosion, the footage does not show the presence of any other potential bomber. This should also be considered in conjunction with the findings of the forensic explosive expert, this

indicates the bombing suspect was within 1 to 2 metres of the vehicle with no person or other obstruction between him and it. It is almost inconceivable that anyone in the position of the suspect with the gun could have survived the blast to such an extent to allow escape.

210. In conclusion, all the evidence indicates that one suspect fired the shots before detonating an improvised explosive device when stood at or near the rear of the vehicle.

Acknowledgements

- Directorate of Information (DOI) Video Laboratory - Metropolitan Police Service, UK.
- Computer Modelling Bureau – Metropolitan Police Service, UK.
- Forensic Science Service (FSS) – London, UK.
- Forensic Science Service Firearms Department – London, UK.
- Forensic Explosive Laboratory (FEL) – DSTL Kent, UK.
- Defence Science & Technology Laboratory (DSTL) – Dorset, UK.
- Radiography Department, Addenbrook's Hospital – Cambridge, UK.
- Forensic Odontologist – Kent. UK.
- Fingerprint Bureau – Metropolitan Police Service – UK.
- Forensic Pathology Services – Abingdon, UK.

211. I am also grateful for the assistance of the Pakistan authorities, the family and close associates of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and Police Officers of SO15 Counter Terrorism command, New Scotland Yard.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'John MacBrayne', written over a horizontal line.

John MacBrayne QPM
Detective Superintendent
SO15 Counter Terrorism Command
New Scotland Yard

SECRET/IMMEDIATE

From The Addl. Inspector General of Police,
CID, Punjab, Lahore.
(Camp office at Police Line-1, Rawalpindi)

To The Secretary,
Government of Pakistan,
Ministry of Interior, Islamabad.

No. 185 /CID

Dated: 19/02 /2008.

Subject: CONFIRMATION ABOUT THE DEATH OF NADIR @ QARI ISMAIL AND NASRULLAH @ AHMAD CASE FIR NO.471/07 DATED 27.12.2007 UNDER SECTIONS 302/324/435/436/120-B PPC 4/5 ESA & 7ATA AT POLICE STATION CITY RAWALPINDI (ASSASSINATION CASE OF MOHTARMA BENAIZIR BHUTTO (SHAHEED)).

MEMORANDUM:

It is intimated that during the course of investigation of the subject case, it has come to the light that on 15.01.2008 about Noon time, the following accused persons while traveling in a car, alongwith a suicide bomber aged 15/16 years were checked at Mehmond Rifles Check Post, Mausooma Khapper Tehsil Alimzai (Mehmond Agency). Meanwhile Nadir @ Qari Ismail and Nasrullah @ Ahmad left the car in an attempt to escape and got injured during firing. Nadir @ Qari ismail died at the spot whereas Nasrullah @ Ahmad was removed to CMH Hospital, Peshawar, where he also died after about 4/5 days of the occurrence. The suicide bomber also exploded him at the spot:-

- i. Nadir @ Qari Ismail s/o Musafir Khan r/o Mauza Khazana, District Sawabi (Room No.83, Madrissa Haqania, Akora Khattak).
- ii. Nasrullah @ Ahmed r/o Waziristan (Student of Madrissa Haqania, Akora Khattak)

2. It is requested that the concerned quarters may kindly be approached to verify the above incident and report the factual position. In case any FIR was registered in this behalf, a copy of the same may also be provided for completion of investigation record.

g/c
(ABDUL MAJEED) PSP
Addl. Inspector General of Police,
CID Punjab, Lahore.

Contd...P/2

No. 186-87/CID

Dated: 19/02 /2008.

A copy is forwarded for information & necessary action to the:-


1. Inspector General of Police, Punjab (**Atten: DIG/Operations**).
2. Secretary, Government of the Punjab, Home Department, Lahore.

o/c


(ABDUL MAJEED) PSP

Addl. Inspector General of Police,
CID Punjab, Lahore.

NETWORK INVOLVED IN ASSASSINATION OF BB
AT LIAQAT ROAD ON 27.12.2007



ACCUSED CHALLANED U/S 11-L, 6-7 ATA IN THE
SUBJECT CASE FOR NON DISCLOSURE OF
INFORMATION



ANNEXURE - 'H'
SECRET/IMMEDIATE

From The Addl. Inspector General of Police,
CID Punjab, Lahore.

To The Secretary,
Government of Pakistan,
Ministry of Interior, Islamabad.

No. 225 /CID

Dated: 07/03 /2008.

Subject: **ACTION AGAINST ACCUSED INDICATED BY ACCUSED
CHALLANED DURING INVESTIGATION IN CASE FIR
NO.471/07 DATED 27.12.2007 U/Ss 302/324/
435/436/120-B/109-PPC, 4/5 ESA & 6/7, PS CITY
RAWALPINDI.**

MEMORANDUM:

During the course of investigation of the subject case, the accused arrested were interrogated thoroughly. They indicated the names of other persons who were indulging in terrorist activities including imparting training to the suicide bombers etc. A detailed vernacular report in this regard is enclosed herewith with the request to direct the quarters concerned to initiate appropriate action against them as per law.

g/c (ABDUL MAJEED) PSP
Addl. Inspector General of Police,
CID Punjab, Lahore.

No. 226-27/CID

Dated: 07/03 /2008.

A copy is forwarded for information to the:-

1. Inspector General of Police, Punjab (***Atten: AIG/Operations***).
2. Secretary, Government of the Punjab, Home Department, Lahore.

g/c (ABDUL MAJEED) PSP
Addl. Inspector General of Police,
CID Punjab, Lahore.

ANNEXURE "K"

1-12


**ASSASSINATION OF
MOHTARMA BENAZIR BHUTTO (SHAHEED)
LIAQAT BAGH RAWALPINDI
27.12.2007**

1	Telephone Linkage - Network of Seven	K-1
2	History of Phone Calls of accused from 26 th to 28 th Dec 2007	K-2
3	Synchronised Footage Report of Scotland Yard Team	K-3
4	Daily The Nation Dated 02.10.2007	K-4
5	Daily Express Dated 02.10.2007	K-5
6	Daily Nawa-i-Waqt Dated 02.10.2007	K-6
7	Daily Khabrain Dated 08.10.2007	K-7
8	Daily Dawn Dated 08.10.2007	K-8
9	Daily Dawn Dated 13.10.2007	K-9
10	Daily Express Dated 19.10.2007	K-10
11	Confirmation of Death of Nadir and Nasrullah	K-11
12	Court Proceedings	K-12

NETWORK OF SEVEN

1.	Nasrullah @ Ahmad	(0304-9684538)
2.	Muhammad Rafaqat	(0331-5013836)
3.	Nadir @ Qari Ismael	(0344-6654236)
4.	Ibad-ur-Rehman @ Nauman @ Usman	(0344-9666465, 0346-9442498)
5.	Husnain Gul @ Ali	(0332-5609682)
6.	Maulvi Sahib	(0965-238387- Kanigram, South Waziristan)
7.	Ameer Sahib(Bait ullah Mehsud)	(0928-230493- Makeen, Razmak)

NETWORK OF SEVEN



NETWORK OF SEVEN

CONTD..

I. NASRULLAH @ AHMAD 21 CALLS

OUT GOING 10				
SR.	CONTACT	CALLS	DATE	TIME
1	Husnain	04	26.12.07	17:24
			27.12.07	13:21
			-Do-	15:07
2	Rafaqat	03	-Do-	17:10
			27.12.07	00:44
			-Do-	00:54
3	Ibad-ur-Rehman	02	-Do-	18:11
			26.12.07	00:58
4	Nadir	01	27.12.07	20:04
			27.12.07	12:28

CONTD.. 101

NETWORK OF SEVEN

CONTD..

INCOMING 11				
SR.	CONTACT	CALLS	DATE	TIME
1	Husnain	07	26.12.07	16:03 16:49
			27.12.07	11:18 12:26 17:15 17:28 17:41
2	Rafaqat	01	27.12.07	12:45
3	Ibad-ur-Rehman	02	27.12.07	20:08 22:04
4	Maulvi Sahib 0965-238387	01	28.12.07	07:51

WORK OF SEVEN

CONTD..

AND RAFAQAT 13 CALLS

OUT GOING 03		
CALLS	DATE	TIME
02	27.12.07	14:02 16:42
01	27.12.07	12:45

INCOMING 10		
07	27.12.07	14:16
		15:08
		16:45
		17:10
		17:14
03	27.12.07	17:30
		17:35
		00:44
		00:54
		18:11

NETWORK OF SEVEN

II. MUHAMMAD RAFAQAT

13 CALLS

CONTD..

OUT GOING 03

SR.	CONTACT	CALLS	DATE	TIME
1	Husnain	02	27.12.07	14:02 16:42
2	Nasrullah	01	27.12.07	12:45

INCOMING 10

1	Husnain	07	27.12.07	14:16 15:08 16:45 17:10 17:14 17:30 17:35
2	Nasrullah	03	27.12.07	00:44 00:54 18:11

NETWORK OF SEVEN

III. NADIR @ QARI ISMAEL 07 CALLS CONTD..

OUT GOING 04				
SR.	CONTACT	CALLS	DATE	TIME
1	0965-238387	04	30.12.07	13:17 14:19 15:28 17:00

INCOMING 03				
SR.	CONTACT	CALLS	DATE	TIME
1	Rafaqat	01	26.12.07	20:19
2	Nasrullah	01	27.12.07	12:28
3	Ibad-ur-Rehman	01	27.12.07	08:17

NETWORK OF SEVEN

IV. IBAD-UR-REHMAN @ NAUMAN @ USMAN **05 CALLS**
CONTD..

OUT GOING 03				
SR.	CONTACT	CALLS	DATE	TIME
1	Nasrullah	02	27.12.07	20:08 22:04
2	Nadir	01	27.12.07	08:17

INCOMING 02				
SR.	CONTACT	CALLS	DATE	TIME
1	Nasrullah	02	26.12.07 27.12.07	00:58 20:04

NETWORK OF SEVEN

CONTD..

V. HUSNAIN GUL @ ALI 20 CALL

OUT GOING 14				
SR.	CONTACT	CALLS	DATE	TIME
1	Rafaqat	07	27.12.07	14:16
				15:08
				16:45
				17:10
				17:14
2	Nasrullah	07	26.12.07	17:30
				17:35
				16:03
				16:49
			27.12.07	11:18
				12:26
				17:15
				17:28
				17:41

CONTD..

NETWORK OF SEVEN

CONTD..

INCOMING 06				
SR.	CONTACT	CALLS	DATE	TIME
1	Rafaqat	02	27.12.07	14:02 16:42
2	Nasrullah	04	26.12.07	17:25
			27.12.07	13:21 15:07 17:10

NETWORK OF SEVEN

CONTD..

VI. Maulvi Sahib (0965-238387 – Kanigram, S. Waziristan) 02 CALLS

OUT GOING 01				
SR.	CONTACT	CALLS	DATE	TIME
1	Nasrullah	01	28.12.07	07:51

INCOMING 01				
SR.	CONTACT	CALLS	DATE	TIME
1	Bait Ullah Mehsud 0928-230493	01	28.12.07	09:14

*0965-238387 is registered in the name of one Haji Shah Wali Khan s/o Muhammad Shah, r/o Kanigram, South Waziristan.

NETWORK OF SEVEN

CONTD..

VII. Bait Ullah Mehsud (0928-230493 – Makeen, Razmak) 01 CALL

OUT GOING 01				
SR.	CONTACT	CALLS	DATE	TIME
1	0965-238387	01	28.12.07	09:14

*0928-230493 is registered in the name of one Mazhar-ud-Din s/o Rehmat Ullah, r/o Dara POL, Makeen, Razmak, South Waziristan

HISTORY OF PHONE CALLS OF ACCUSED FROM 26TH TO 28TH DEC 2007

#	Caller Name	Ph.No.	Receiver	Ph. No.	Date	Call Time	Summary of suspects' conversation on phones as per their statements
1	Ibad-ur-Rehman uses Nasrullah phone	0304-9684538	Husnain Gul @ Ali	0332-5609682	26.12.07	17:24	Ibad-ur-Rehman calls from Nasrullah's phone and conveys that he is sending Nasrullah, Saeed @ Bilal and Ikramullah
2	Nasrullah @ Ahmed	0304-9684538	Husnain Gul @ Ali	0332-5609682	"	22:35	Subsequently, Nasrullah calls and says that they are coming.
3	Nasrullah @ Ahmad	0304-9684538	Rafaqat Hussain	0331-5013836	27.12.07	00:43 00:54	Contacted on phone and picked up Nasrullah, Saeed and Ikram from Pir Wadal More.
4	Nasrullah @ Ahmad	0304-9684358	Husnain Gul @ Ali	0332-5609682	"	13:20	Nasrullah says in code words: "There is none at home, bring them for food."
5	Rafaqat Hussain	0331-5013836	Husnain Gul @ Ali	0332-5609682	"	14:02	Rafaqat says that he is coming to take Fadayeen.
6	Husnain Gul @ Ali	0332-5609682	Rafaqat Hussain	0331-5013836	"	14:16	On completion of 'Fadayeen's' preparation, Rafaqat says that he has come on vehicle.
7	Nasrullah @ Ahmad	0304-9684538	Husnain Gul @ Ali	0332-5609682	"	15:05	Nasrullah calls when Benazir arrives Liaqat Bagh
8	Husnain Gul @ Ali	0332-5609682	Rafaqat Hussain	0331-5013836	"	17:35	After incident, Rafaqat tells Husnain that he is standing near Novelty Cinema.
9	Husnain Gul @ Ali	0332-5609682	Nasrullah @ Ahmad	0304-9684538	"	17:41	Nasrullah asks from where he can get taxi.
10	Nasrullah @ Ahmad	0304-9684538	Rafaqat Hussain	0331-5013836	"	18:09	Again contact: Got taxi and going towards Daewoo Adda.
11	Maulvi Sahib	096-5238387	Nasrullah @ Ahmad	0304-96845387	28.12.07	07:51	Maulvi calls on Nasrullah's number
12	Amir Sahib (Bait Ullah Mehsud)	092830493	Maulvi Sahib	096-5238387	"	09:14	Exchanged congratulation on BB's assassination while acknowledging that their men Bilal and Ikram Ullah have done this. Aitezaz Shah identifies Bait Ullah Mehsud's voice. Nasrullah received call from the same no.

SYNCHRONISED FOOTAGE RECORDED AT
30 FRAMES PER SECOND

Key timings on footage:

- 1st shot to 2nd shot = 13 frames (0.433 sec)
- 2nd shot to 3rd shot = 10 frames (0.333 sec)
- 3rd shot to blast = 25 frames (0.833 sec)
- 1st shot to last shot = 23 frames (0.766 sec)
- 1st shot to blast = 48 frames (1.6 sec)
- 3rd shot to BB head = 03 frames (0.1 sec)
- disappearing from view
- BB disappearing from sight to blast = 22 frames (0.6 sec)

I might allow US strike

From page 1

Though, PPP sources reluctant to confirm the meeting taking place on October 2 between the representatives of the Musharraf regime and their leader, they cautiously stated that a final round was expected before the party's meeting of the Central Executive Committee (CEC), scheduled for October 3.

The two-day meeting of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) Central Executive Committee (CEC) would be held on October 2 in London under the Chair of Benazir Bhutto. The Nation has learnt.

The sources said that the CEC meeting would discuss the return of Benazir Bhutto to Pakistan and other issues related to the presidential election in order to chalk out a final strategy.

According to the sources, the final round of talks between PPP Chairperson Benazir Bhutto and aides of General Pervez Musharraf would try to conclude a power-sharing deal, as Benazir is going to have a make or break session with the Musharraf's top confidants so that she could be in a position to hammer out her party's strategy, either to go in tandem with Musharraf or against him, in their London CEC.

The sources claimed that Musharraf's special aides would leave for London on Monday to have decisive round with Benazir.

"If General Pervez Musharraf does not doff his uniform before or on October 5 then the PPP parliamentarians would resign from their membership of national and provincial assemblies", PPP-P sources said.

On the other hand, Benazir has directed her party legislators to summon meeting on October 5 and stay ready for resignations provided that Musharraf is re-elected in uniform, the sources said. In case, the sources rushed to add, President General Pervez Musharraf doffs his uniform before the presidential poll, then the PPP members would not resign from the assemblies and would either oppose or abstain the vote for Musharraf's re-election.

Benazir on Osama's elimination I might allow US military strike inside Pakistan

OUR MONITORING DESK

PPP Chairperson and former prime minister Benazir Bhutto said on Monday that she might allow a US military strike inside Pakistan to eliminate Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden if she were the country's leader, reports The New York Times.

"I would hope that I would be able to take Osama bin Laden myself without depending on the Americans. But if I couldn't do it, of course we are fighting this war together and (I) would seek their cooperation in eliminating him," she said in an interview on BBC World News America.

Benazir Bhutto, who has vowed to return to Pakistan on October 18 after eight years of exile, was speaking less than a week before an October 6 election that President Pervez Musharraf is expected to win despite his slumping popularity.

She has been in talks with Musharraf about a post-election power-sharing deal that would shore up his position, which has become more precarious amid violent clashes with militants.

Asked by the BBC whether she would agree to let the Americans take action against Osama in Pakistan, Benazir said her decision would depend on the



strength of the evidence.

"I think one really needs to see the information. So I would really, really need to see the evidence," she said, according to a transcript of the BBC interview.

"But if there was evidence, my first reference would be to go in myself and if ... there was a difficulty on that I'd like to cooperate with the Americans."

Naveed Butt from Islamabad adds: Final or stated to be the decisive round of talks between Musharraf's aides and Pakistan People's Party Benazir Bhutto, is going to take place London on Tuesday (today) in London.

See page 9, col 5..

SECRET/IMMEDIATE

From The Addl. Inspector General of Police,
CID Punjab, Lahore.

To The Inspector General of Police,
Punjab, Lahore.
(Atten: AIG/Operations)

No. 267 /CID


Dated: 20-6- /2008.

Subject: **CONFIRMATION ABOUT THE DEATH OF NADIR @ QARI ISMAIL AND NASRULLAH @ AHMAD - CASE FIR NO.471/2007 DATED 27.12.2007 UNDER SECTION 302/324/435/436/120-B PPC 4/5 ESA & 7ATA AT POLICE STATION CITY RAWALPINDI (ASSASSINATION OF CASE OF MOHTARMA BENAZIR BHUTTO, SHAHEED).**

MEMORANDUM:

Kindly refer to this office Memo. No.261-64/CID dated 31.05.2008 wherein a clarification regarding two conflicting reports on the subject cited above was sought.

2. The Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Interior, National Crisis Management Cell, Islamabad vide letter No.3/4/2008-(O&I) dated 11.06.2008 informed that the report of Assistant Political Agent, Upper Mohmand Agency is authentic whereas that of Police Department has been declared as hearsay. Copies of the relevant documents are enclosed for further necessary action.

o/c

(MALIK MUHAMMAD IQBAL) PSP
Addl. Inspector General of Police,
CID Punjab, Lahore.


Conted.....P/2

No. /CID

Dated: 20-6- /2008.

A copy is forwarded for information to the:-

1. Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad w/r to Director (Operations), National Crisis Management Cell letter No.3/4/2008-(O&I) dated 11.06.2008.
2. Secretary, Government of the Punjab, Home Department, Lahore.
3. Mr. Abdul Majeed, Regional Police Officer, Faisalabad.
4. City Police Officer, Rawalpindi.
5. Raja Basharat Mehmood, DSP/CID, Rawalpindi.

o/c  20/6
(MALIK MUHAMMAD IQBAL) PSP
Addl. Inspector General of Police,
CID Punjab, Lahore.

SECRET/MOST IMMEDIATE


No. 3/4/2008-(O&I)
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT CELL

Islamabad, the 11th June 2008

Subject:- Confirmation about the death of Nadir @ Qari Ismail and Nasrullah @ Ahmad Case FIR No. 471/07 dated 27-12-2007 under sections 302/324/435/436/120/B PPC 4/5 ESA & 7ATA at Police Station City Rawalpindi (Assassination case of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto Shaheed)

Please refer to your letter No. 261/CID dated 31st May 2008 on the subject.

2. Enclosed please find herewith response received from AIG of Police, Investigation NWFP vide their letter No. 3171/Researchg/Investigation dated 11th June 2008.


Lt Col
(Muhammad Imran Yaqub)
Director (Operations)
For Director General

Mr. Abdul Majeed
Additional Inspector General of Police,
CID, Punjab,
Lahore



No.PS/SS/HD-2008
GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB
HOME DEPARTMENT

Dated Lahore, the 15th May, 2008

To

The Additional Inspector General of Police (CID),
Punjab, Lahore.

SUBJECT: CONFIRMATION ABOUT THE DEATH OF NADIR @ QARI
ISMAIL AND NASRULLAH @ AHMAD - CASE FIR NO. 471/07
DATED 27.12.2007

Enclosed please find copy of a letter received from the Government of NWFP, Home & Tribal Affairs Department, Peshawar bearing No.SO(FATA)HD/12-18/03 dated 26.04.2008 alongwith its enclosures in response to Government of Punjab, Home Department's letter No.PS/HS/72/2008 dated 16.03.2008 on the subject noted above for further necessary action.

15/5/08
(AZAM SALEEM)
SPECIAL SECRETARY
GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB
HOME DEPARTMENT



Copy to:

PS to Home Secretary, Punjab.

cc Addl IGP/CID, Punjab, Lahore.

Adl IGP	✓	A
IG/CID		
SP/Admn/Coord		
SP/Analysis		

(photo copy)



GOVERNMENT OF NWFP
HOME & TRIBAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT

><><><<
No. SO (FATA) HD/12 - 18/03
Dated Peshawar the April 26, 2008

9/5
AS (IS)

To

The Home Secretary,
Punjab, Lahore.

Subject:

CONFIRMATION ABOUT THE DEATH OF
NADIR @ QARI ISMAIL AND NASRULLAH @
AHMAD - CASE FIR NO. 471/07 DATED
27/12/2007.

Dear Sir,

I am directed to refer to your letter No. PS/HS/72/2008 dated 16/03/2008 on the subject mentioned above and to enclose herewith copies of letter No. 1259/GB dated 18/03/2008 and No. 362/APA (UM) dated 31/03/2008 for favour of information and further necessary action.

5/6

Special Secretary
Home Department
Diary No. _____
Dated: _____

Yours faithfully,

(MUHAMMAD ISMAIL)
Section Officer (FATA)
Phone: 091-9210078

The District Police Officer,
Swabi.

The Additional Inspector General of Police,
Investigation, NWFP, Peshawar.


1259 /GB, dated Swabi the, 18-3-08.

Subject:- CONFIRMATION ABOUT THE DEATH OF NADIR @ QARI
ISMAIL AND NASRULLAH @ AHMAD CASE FIR NO. 471/07
DATED 27.12.07 U/S 302/324/435-436/120-B PPC
4/5 ESA & SECTION 7 ATA, PS RAWALPINDI ASSASSINATION
OF CASE OF MOHTARMA BENAZIR BHUTTO (SHAHEED).

Memo:-

Kindly refer to your office Memo: No. 1283-84/Research
Investigation dated 13.3.08.

An enquiry was conducted through local Police of
Police Station Topi which reveals that Nadir s/o Musafir r/o
Kalabat is un-married and his parents are died. It was also
transpired that he was admitted in the Madrassa of Akora
Khattak for getting religious education who has not visited
his village for the last 6/7 months. According to rumour he is
died but it is not confirmed at the local level. His one
brother namely Munair who was serving in Pak: Army is already
died and his three other brothers are alive who are not
present in the village.


District Police Officer,
Swabi.

No. 362 /APA(UM),

Dated Ghallanai the/ 31 / 03/2008

From: -

The Asstt: Political Agent,
Upper Mohmand at Ghallanai.

To :-

The Political Agent,
Mohmand at Ghallanai.

Subject: -

Confirmation about the death of Nadir &
Qari Ismail and Nasrullah & Ahmad Case FIR
No.471/07 dated 27.12.2007 under sections
302/324/435/436/120-B PPC 4/5 & 7ATA at Police
station city Rawalpindi (Assassination case
of Mohtarama Benazir Bhutto (Shahheed).

Memorandum.

Kindly refer to your office Endst: No.188/
Reader, dated 28.3.2008 on the above noted subject.

As verified by PNT Halimzai that Nadir son of
Musafir Khan r/o Khazana Kalabat District Sawabi, Nasrullah
s/o Mir Alam Khan r/o Dandi Saidgi Tehsil Ghulam Khan North
Waziristan Agency alongwith a teen aged boy were coming in a
Land Cruiser on 15.1.2008, reaching at Khapakh Check Post
Halimzai area. The vehicle was stopped at the check post for
checking purpose. Ismail and Nasrullah made an attempt to
escape from the spot and exploded the teen aged boy in the
vehicle. The Mohmand Rifles and khassadars posted at the check
post opened fire at the two persons. Nadir was killed on the
spot while Nasrullah s/o Mir Alam Khan was injured who was
taken to C.M.H. Peshawar for treatment, where he also expired.

Revised: 10

Assistant Political Agent,
Upper Mohmand at Ghallanai.

SECRET/MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 3/15/07-BB-(O&I)
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT CELL

Islamabad, the 27th May 2008


To:- Mr. Abdul Majeed
Addl. Inspector General of Police
CID, Punjab, Lahore

Subject: - Confirmation about the death of Nadir @ Qari Ismail and Nasrullah @ Ahmad – Case FIR No. 471/2007 dated 27-12-2007 under sections 302/324/435/436/120-B PPC 4/5 ESA & 7 ATA at Police Station City Rawalpindi (Assassination of case of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto (Shaheed))


Reference Addl. Inspector General of Police, CIA, Punjab, Lahore

letter No. 185/CID dated 18-02-2008 on the subject.

2. Enclosed please find herewith feedback report provided by Home & Tribal Areas, Peshawar letter No. 3/20-SO (L&O)/HP/08 Vol 13 dated 27th May 2008 on the subject as desired.


Lt Col
(Muhammad Imran Yaqub)
Director (Operations)
for Director General

PA:
D.M. up letter for
the Punjab ITR to Hs. Govt of
UNEP 2
3/15



GOVERNMENT OF N.-W.F.P.
HOME & T.A.s. DEPARTMENT.

Through Fax

No 3/20-50 (LEO) /HD/08 vs. 13

Dated Peshawar the 27-5- 2008

To,
The Director (Operations),
Government of Pakistan,
Ministry of Interior,
National Crisis Management Cell,
Islamabad.

Subject:- CONFIRMATION ABOUT THE DEATH OF NADIR @ QARI ISMAI AND NASRULLAH @ AHMAD - CASE FIR NO.471/07 DATED 27/12/2007 UNDER SECTIONS 302/324/435/436/120-B PPC 4/5 ESA & 7 ATA AT POLICE STATION CITY RAWALPINDI (ASSISSINATION CASE OF MOHTARAMA BENAZIR BHUTTO (SHAHEED)).

Dear Sir,

I am directed to refer to your letter No.3/15/07/-BB-(O&I) dated 21/2/2008 on the subject noted above and to state that according to the Additional Inspector General of Police (Investigation), NWFP, an enquiry was conducted through the District Police Officers, Swabi and Nowshera.

2- District Police Officer, Nowshera has informed that Nadir alias Qari Ismail son of Musafir of Khazana District Swabi and Nasrullah alias Ahmed of Waziristan could not be proved to be the students of Darul Ulume Haqania Akora Khattak as per record and statement of the teachers of said Madrassa.

3- District Police Officer Swabi has also informed that Nadir son of Musafir resident of Swabi Kalabat is missing from his village for the last five years without any contact with his relatives.

Yours faithfully,

Masood Siddiqui
(Masood Siddiqui)

Section Officer (Law & Order)

Endst.No. & Date even.

Copy forwarded for information to P S to Secretary, Home & TAs Deptt.

NWFP

Masood Siddiqui

Handwritten notes:
Lecture and
CIO Punjab
27/5

COURT PROCEEDINGS

A) 10.03.08

- Court issued copies of statements of witness u/161 CrPC to accused.
- Case adjourned for 18.03.08

B) 18.03.08

- On non-compliance of warrants of arrest of absconding accused, Baitullah Mehsud, etc., court issued proclamations u/s 87 CrPC against them.
- Accused Sher Zaman @ Sheeri's bail application was moved.
- Accused Aitzaz Shah moved application for transfer of his case to the court of competent jurisdiction on the ground that he was minor.
- Case fixed for 21.04.08

CONTD...

COURT PROCEEDINGS

C) 21.04.08

- Statements of officials deputed to serve proclamations were recorded.
- Due to engagements of State Counsel in High Court, hearing of said application of Sher Zaman accused was adjourned for 10.05.08
- Accused Aitzaz Shah's application for transfer of his case to the competent court was adjourned for arguments for 10.05.08.

D) 10.05.08

- Proclamations of Baitullah Mehsud (05 accused) were issued. Proceedings of 88 CrPC are in progress.
- Accused Sher Zaman's bail application was fixed for hearing for 31.05.08.
- Learned court directed for medical examination of Aitzaz Shah for determination of his age.
- Case was adjourned for 31.05.08.

CONTD...

COURT PROCEEDINGS

E) 31.05.08

On behalf of accused Aitzaz Shah and accused Sher Zaman, Advocate Rao Fazal Khan Akhtar and Advocate Abdul Karim Mashad appeared in the court respectively.

The statement of SI Hayat Muhammad, PS City Rawalpindi was recorded regarding warrant of confiscation of property of accused Faiz Muhammad Keskit and Abdur Rehman @ Nauman.

Due to lawyers' strike, no further proceedings took place.

The case was adjourned for 21.06.08.

F) 21.06.08

Regarding accused Syed Aitzaz Shah @ Saif Ullah, the competent court ordered that minor challan u/s 11-L may be submitted separately on 14.07.2008.

The bail applications of accused Sher Zaman @ Sheeri, Aitzaz Shah and Rasheed have been dismissed.

Next date of hearing is fixed on 14.07.2008